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Reconsidering Substantive Canons 
Anita S. Krishnakumar† 
This Article provides the first empirical study of the Roberts Court’s use of 
substantive canons in statutory interpretation cases. Based on data from 296 cases, 
the Article argues that much of the conventional wisdom about substantive canons 
of statutory construction is wrong, or at least overstated with respect to the modern 
Supreme Court. Substantive canons—for example, the rule of lenity, the avoidance 
canon, and the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic laws—
have long been criticized as undemocratic judge-made rules that defeat congres-
sional intent, enable interpreters to massage different meanings out of the same 
text, and make statutory interpretation unpredictable. Scholars have bemoaned the 
amount of work that substantive canons perform in statutory interpretation cases, 
and several have charged that textualist judges in particular overuse such canons. 
But virtually all of these critiques have occurred in the absence of empirical evi-
dence about how judges invoke substantive canons in practice. 
This Article reconsiders the substantive canons in light of new data collected 
from the Roberts Court. The data show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
substantive canons are infrequently invoked on the modern Court—and even when 
invoked, they rarely play an outcome-determinative role in the Court’s statutory 
constructions. Perhaps most surprisingly, textualist justices—including Justice 
Antonin Scalia—rarely invoke substantive canons in the opinions they author, and 
do so less often than most of their purposivist counterparts. Moreover, contrary to 
the conventional view that substantive canons empower judges to read their per-
sonal policy preferences into statutes, the Court’s conservative justices have em-
ployed substantive canons to support liberal case outcomes as often, or nearly as 
often, as they have employed such canons to support conservative outcomes. Fur-
ther, doctrinal analysis shows that the Roberts Court repeatedly has used substan-
tive canons to honor, rather than frustrate, congressional intent. 
The Article also challenges scholars’ gloomy warnings that justices in 
the modern, textualism-influenced era have replaced legislative history with 
 
 † Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. I owe deep thanks for valu-
able insights and conversations to Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, William N. Eskridge, Abbe R. 
Gluck, Rebecca M. Kysar, Margaret H. Lemos, Katherine Shaw, Lawrence Solan, Nelson 
Tebbe, and Adam Zimmerman. I am especially indebted to my husband, Ron Tucker, for 
his patience with this project. Special thanks to Dean Michael A. Simons and St. John’s 
University School of Law for generous research assistance and to participants at work-
shops and colloquia at Yale Law School and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law for 
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Christina Corcoran, Sade Forte, Ilya 
Mordukhaev, Jennifer Roseman, Samuel Sroka, Rita Wang, Kim Friedman, Lissa Yang, 
Peter Ryan, Vince Nibali, Christine Sammarco, and Thomas Combs provided terrific re-
search assistance. Thanks also to the editors at The University of Chicago Law Review 
for their excellent work. All errors are my own. 
KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017 11:25 AM 
826  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:825 
     
substantive canons as the go-to resource for deciphering ambiguous statutory text. 
Rather, the data from the Roberts Court show that most of the justices referenced 
legislative history at higher rates than they referenced substantive canons. More-
over, the Court’s own precedents—rather than substantive canons or legislative 
history—seem to be the unsung gap-filling mechanism that the justices turn to 
when confronted with unclear statutory text. After reporting the data, the Article 
discusses the implications of its findings for current debates in statutory interpre-
tation, arguing that statutory interpretation theory needs to pay less attention to 
substantive canons and more attention to how the Court employs precedents when 
construing statutes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a popular belief among statutory interpretation 
scholars that substantive canons of statutory construction—that 
is, policy-based background norms or presumptions such as the 
rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional avoidance—act as an 
“escape valve” that helps textualist judges eschew, or “mitigate,” 
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the rigors of textualism.1 As Professor William Eskridge has 
noted, “[T]he textualist who refuses to consider legislative his-
tory will be sorely tempted to rely on [substantive canons] to 
provide necessary context and analysis for deciding issues of in-
terpretation.”2 The conventional wisdom is that substantive can-
ons operate as an interpretive trump card, allowing judges to re-
ject statutory readings dictated by other tools of construction in 
favor of readings based on external policy considerations.3 In the 
conventional telling, substantive canons are thought to wield 
significant power—indeed, too much power—over interpretive 
outcomes. 
Scholars on both sides of the textualist-purposivist divide 
have criticized substantive canons, although textualists also 
have defended some substantive canons as entrenched back-
ground conventions that Congress is aware of when it legis-
lates.4 Justice Antonin Scalia, notably, decried substantive can-
ons as “dice-loading” devices;5 but he, in turn, has been accused 
of employing such canons generously when it suited his ends.6 
Scholars have pointed out that substantive canons are counter-
majoritarian, subject to judicial invention and reinvention, and 
 
 1 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum L Rev 1, 
125 (2001). See also William N. Eskridge Jr, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation 
and Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 743 (West Academic 5th ed 
2014) (“Critics could suggest that . . . every human interpretive technique, including tex-
tualism, needs a ‘safety valve’ of some sort.”). 
 2 William N. Eskridge Jr, Book Review, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich 
L Rev 1509, 1542 (1998), reviewing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed). 
 3 See, for example, Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 
90 BU L Rev 109, 109–10 (2010); Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545–46 (cited 
in note 2). 
 4 See Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1); Scalia, A Matter of Inter-
pretation at 29 (cited in note 2) (defending the rule of lenity and rules requiring a clear 
statement to eliminate state sovereignty or to waive the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity). 
 5 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 28 (cited in note 2). 
 6 See, for example, Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1512 n 9 (cited in 
note 2) (“Scalia warns that ‘to the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and 
presumptions are a lot of trouble,’ and criticizes the substantive canons. Yet Scalia him-
self not only cites but heavily relies on these ‘substantive’ canons.”) (brackets and cita-
tions omitted); id at 1543–46 (discussing Scalia’s use of a substantive canon in BFP v 
Resolution Trust Corp, 511 US 531 (1994)); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective 
Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Author-
ity, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky L J 527, 551 (1997–98) (“Justice Scalia and 
other modern textualists often use ‘clear-statement canons’ that require express congres-
sional authorization for a particular type of government regulatory action.”). 
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difficult for Congress to overcome.7 Recent work has character-
ized substantive canons as the equivalent of federal common 
law, explored the theoretical tension between textualism and the 
substantive canons, and concluded that the constitutionally 
based canons, at least, are defensible on a “faithful agent” theory 
of statutory interpretation.8 
Virtually all of this theorizing has occurred in the absence of 
empirical evidence about how often judges invoke substantive 
canons or how much work such canons perform in statutory cases 
when invoked. There is a general consensus that the avoidance 
canon has been much abused9 and that the rule of lenity has 
fallen into disuse,10 but no one has examined the federal courts’ 
 
 7 See, for example, Neal Kumar Katyal and Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoid-
ance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv L Rev 2109, 2119 (2015); 
William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593, 636–40 (1992); Eskridge, 
Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1542–43 (cited in note 2); William N. Eskridge Jr, The 
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 683–84 (1990). 
 8 See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for 
the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 753, 778–79 (2013) (theorizing that at least some 
of the canons might be viewed as a kind of federal common law); Barrett, 90 BU L Rev at 
169 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that judges act as “faithful agents of the Constitution” 
when they apply constitutionally based substantive canons). 
 9 See, for example, Katyal and Schmidt, 128 Harv L Rev at 2129–53 (cited in 
note 7) (discussing and critiquing the use of the avoidance canon in several recent 
Supreme Court cases); Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public 
Choice to Improve Public Law 105 (Yale 1997) (describing the avoidance canon as subop-
timal given game theory analysis); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions 
as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L Rev 831, 834–35 (2001) (calling for the aban-
donment of the avoidance canon on separation-of-powers grounds); John F. Manning, 
The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 S Ct Rev 223, 228 (criticizing 
the enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine through the use of the avoidance canon); 
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 S Ct Rev 71, 94–95 (criticizing the avoid-
ance canon as being disguised judicial activism); Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v. 
Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 S Ct 
Rev 49, 49–50, 73 (criticizing a specific application of the avoidance canon); Clay v Sun 
Insurance Office Ltd, 363 US 207, 213–14 (1960) (Black dissenting) (accusing the Court 
of “carrying the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions to a wholly unjustifiable 
extreme,” and arguing that “there are times when a constitutional question is so im-
portant that it should be decided even though judicial ingenuity would find a way to 
escape it”); Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in 
Wallace Mendelson, ed, Felix Frankfurter: The Judge 30, 45 (Reynal 1964) (warning that 
the avoidance canon risks judicial rewriting of statutes); Richard A. Posner, The Federal 
Courts: Crisis and Reform 284–86 (Harvard 1985) (similar); Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 
314 n 9 (1993) (calling the avoidance canon “the last refuge of many an interpretive lost 
cause”). 
 10 See, for example, Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 
Fordham L Rev 885, 885 (2004) (arguing that the rule “has lately fallen out of favor with 
both courts and commentators”); The Supreme Court 2007 Term: Leading Cases, 122 
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use of substantive canons systematically. Instead, based on an-
ecdote and speculation, much of it fueled by the Rehnquist 
Court’s creation of several federalism clear statement rules in 
the 1980s and 1990s or the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance 
canon in recent high-profile cases,11 scholars have taken for 
granted that substantive canons play a regular, decisive role in 
the judicial interpretation of statutes—and that textualism 
needs to articulate a justification for its subscribers’ frequent 
use of such canons. But what if it turns out that these scholarly 
assumptions are wrong—or at least overstated—in several im-
portant respects? 
This Article provides the first empirical study of the Roberts 
Court’s use of substantive canons in its statutory interpretation 
cases. Based on data from 296 statutory interpretation cases de-
cided by the Roberts Court during its first six and a half terms, 
the Article reports several surprising findings that call into 
doubt the conventional account of substantive canons and, par-
ticularly, their relationship to textualism. Five points stand out: 
(1) contrary to popular claims that textualist judges rely on sub-
stantive canons frequently, the Court’s textualist justices rarely 
invoked substantive canons in the opinions they authored (11.0 
percent and 11.7 percent for Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas, 
respectively), and did so no more often than their nontextualist 
counterparts;12 (2) despite the ubiquity of substantive canons and 
charges that judges regularly invent new ones, only a handful of 
 
Harv L Rev 276, 475 (2008) (“Though lenity was a robust doctrine for much of this coun-
try’s legal development, in recent decades lenity has been disfavored, a deciding factor in 
only a limited subset of cases if at all.”). See also Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 Harv 
L Rev 2420, 2420 (2006). 
 11 See, for example, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v 
Holder, 557 US 193, 205 (2009); National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 
132 S Ct 2566, 2594 (2012). 
 12 See Table 1. Note also that two of the Court’s textualist-leaning justices, Justices 
Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy, likewise referenced substantive canons at decidedly 
low rates (< 20.0 percent), as did most of the nontextualist justices. See id. For character-
izations of Alito and Kennedy as textualist judges, see Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Ju-
risdiction, 108 Colum L Rev 1883, 1887 & n 14 (2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—
clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito 
and Kennedy—on the Supreme Court now consider themselves textualists.”); John F. 
Duffy, In re Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court 
(Patently-O, Feb 5, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/J86F-NXGF (“[T]here is now likely 
a majority of current Justices (including the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas and Alito) who adhere to some form of fairly rigorous textualism in statutory 
interpretation.”); Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 & n 505 (cited in note 1) (calling 
Kennedy a textualist’s “fellow traveler[ ]”). 
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substantive canons appear to be doing meaningful work on the 
modern Court;13 (3) a majority of the Roberts Court’s references 
to substantive canons have been in passing, as makeweight or 
secondary arguments, with only a small number of cases relying 
significantly on such canons; (4) when the Court did rely signifi-
cantly on substantive canons, it often exhibited more attentive-
ness to Congress’s intent than the conventional view of substan-
tive canons accounts for; and (5) contrary to the popular belief 
that substantive canons empower judges to decide cases based 
on their personal policy preferences, the Court’s conservative 
justices invoked substantive canons to support liberal outcomes 
nearly as often, and in some cases more often, than they invoked 
such canons to support conservative outcomes. 
These findings have important theoretical implications. For 
example, they raise the question: If textualist judges are not rely-
ing on substantive canons to mitigate the rigors of textualism, 
then what interpretive tools are they using to serve that function? 
Data from textualist-authored opinions in which substantive 
canons were not used suggest that the answer to this question 
is Supreme Court precedent and, to some extent, practical-
consequences-based reasoning.14 The findings also suggest that 
some of the criticisms leveled against substantive canons may be 
overstated—for example, substantive canons may be less prone 
to invention and reinvention than previously thought. Indeed, in 
six and a half terms, I counted only four instances in which the 
members of the Roberts Court invoked an arguably “new” sub-
stantive canon—and over half of the Court’s substantive canon 
references involved one of just six well-established canons.15 This 
means that despite the wide array of substantive canons created 
over the past two centuries, the Roberts Court was remarkably 
constrained, and somewhat predictable, in the canons it tended 
to invoke. The data also suggest that substantive canons may be 
applied in a manner that is more supportive of congressional in-
tent than the conventional account recognizes.16 Doctrinal analy-
sis of the handful of cases in the data set in which the Court did 
rely significantly on substantive canons reveals that, in several 
instances, the Court used the avoidance canon to read a statute 
 
 13 See Appendix (listing cases and substantive canons invoked). 
 14 See Part III.B. 
 15 See Appendix; text accompanying notes 140–41. 
 16 See Part II.C. 
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in a manner that honored a recent congressional override, or to 
preserve a long-standing statute against constitutional chal-
lenge.17 In other cases, the Court employed substantive canons 
in tandem with, or as an approximation of, congressional in-
tent.18 These cases stand in marked contrast to the conventional 
wisdom—including recent commentary about the Roberts 
Court19—arguing that the Court uses substantive canons to dis-
place legislative preferences with judicial ones. 
Further, the data from this study suggest that, in practice, 
there may not be the stark textualist-purposivist divide that 
scholars have described regarding whether to consult substan-
tive canons or legislative history to provide contextual clues 
about statutory meaning.20 As Part II describes in detail, eight of 
the eleven justices who have served on the Roberts Court for a 
significant amount of time have referenced legislative history at 
higher rates—sometimes much higher rates—than they have 
referenced substantive canons. Even archtextualist Scalia in-
voked substantive canons at almost the same rate as he invoked 
legislative history—an interpretive resource he considered ille-
gitimate—and Thomas referenced both of these tools at quite 
low rates, suggesting a miserly view of both.21 In addition, the 
data on levels of reliance provide some support for pragmatists’ 
contentions that the canons of construction do not play much of 
a role in the judicial interpretation of statutes, and that judges 
 
 17 See Parts II.C.1–2. 
 18 See Part II.C.3. 
 19 See Katyal and Schmidt, 128 Harv L Rev at 2112 (cited in note 7) (arguing that 
the Roberts Court employs “[a]ctive avoidance” that emboldens judicial activism and 
“leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little resemblance to laws actually 
passed by the elected branches”); Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 
Green Bag 2d 173, 182–84 (2014). 
 20 See, for example, Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Inter-
pretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L J 
1750, 1842 (2010) (asserting that the Supreme Court currently is grappling with the 
question of “how ambiguity is discerned and, once found, whether legislative history or 
canons come next,” and that “at least part of what divides textualists from purposivists 
on the modern U.S. Supreme Court seems to be that textualists put canons second, 
whereas purposivists choose legislative history most of the time”). 
 21 See Table 1 (reporting that Scalia referenced substantive canons in 11.0 percent 
(nine of eighty-two) of the cases he authored and legislative history in 9.8 percent (eight 
of eighty-two), and that Thomas invoked substantive canons in 11.7 percent (nine of 
seventy-seven) of the cases he authored and legislative history in 7.8 percent (six of 
seventy-seven)). 
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use them as mere “window-dressing” to shore up interpretations 
reached primarily through other tools.22 
Finally, taken as a whole, the data suggest that the Roberts 
Court’s treatment of substantive canons correlates surprisingly 
well with the methodological stare decisis employed by several 
state courts—which place substantive canons last in the hierar-
chy of statutory construction tools23—and with the rules of statu-
tory construction codified by many state legislatures, which list 
only a handful of substantive canons among the rules they in-
struct state courts to follow.24 The Roberts Court’s limited use of 
substantive canons also seems to accord with the preferences of 
congressional staffers in charge of drafting legislation, who rank 
substantive canons behind legislative history and rules on 
agency deference when asked about the usefulness of particular 
interpretive aids.25 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the 
conventional understanding of substantive canons. Part II re-
ports the findings from my study of the Roberts Court’s substan-
tive canon use from January 2006, when Justice Samuel Alito 
joined the Court, to the end of the Court’s 2011 term. It also 
provides doctrinal analysis of several cases in which the Court 
relied significantly on substantive canons, and examines the 
tools the Court invoked when it did not reference substantive 
canons. Part III explores the theoretical implications of the data 
and doctrinal observations. 
I.  THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT 
Before exploring the conventional wisdom surrounding sub-
stantive canons in detail, it is worth pausing for a moment to 
 
 22 William N. Eskridge Jr, Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 66 U Chi L Rev 671, 679 (1999). See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory 
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 
Vand L Rev 395, 401 (1950) (“[T]o make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the 
construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the 
canon.”). 
 23 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1778, 1805–06 (cited in note 20) (describing approaches 
adopted by several state supreme courts). 
 24 See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
Georgetown L J 341, 382–401 (2010). 
 25 See Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901, 966 (2013) (showing legislative drafters’ perceptions of which 
interpretive tools are most useful to courts in determining congressional intent). 
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define some terms. First, what are “substantive canons”? “The 
phrase ‘canons of construction’ is understood to encompass a set 
of background norms and conventions that are used by courts 
when interpreting statutes.”26 Many scholars further divide the 
“canons of construction” into two categories: language canons 
and substantive canons.27 Language canons, as their name sug-
gests, focus on the text of the statute and encompass rules of 
syntax and grammar, “whole act” rules about how different pro-
visions of the same statute should be read in connection with 
each other (for example, to minimize internal inconsistency or to 
avoid superfluity), and Latin maxims such as expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius and noscitur a sociis.28 Substantive canons, by 
contrast, are principles and presumptions that judges have cre-
ated to protect important background norms derived from the 
Constitution, common-law practices, or policies related to par-
ticular subject areas.29 Substantive canons sometimes operate as 
tiebreakers, or thumbs on the scale, but in recent years they 
 
 26 James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 7 (2005), citing Cass R. Sunstein, After 
the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 147 (Harvard 1990). 
 27 For detailed explanations of this dichotomy, see David L. Shapiro, Continuity 
and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 NYU L Rev 921, 927–41 (1992); Eskridge, et 
al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 643, 657–59, 690–93 (cited in 
note 1); Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 12–14 (cited in note 26). Language can-
ons and substantive canons are also sometimes referred to as descriptive and normative 
canons. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress 
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand L Rev 561, 563 (1992) (summarizing the distinc-
tion between descriptive canons, which are based on particular uses of language, gram-
mar, or syntax, and normative canons, which dictate that ambiguous text be construed 
in favor of certain judicially crafted policy objectives). 
 28 For examples of all of these types of language canons, see Eskridge, et al, Cases 
and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 657–90 (cited in note 1). The maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “expression . . . of one thing indicates exclu-
sion of the other.” Id at 668. The rule rests on a logical assumption of negative implica-
tion; if the legislature specifically enumerates certain items in a statute, this is taken to 
imply a deliberate exclusion of all other items. Id. See also Norman J. Singer and 
Shambie Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23 at 406–13 (Thomson 
Reuters rev 7th ed 2014). Noscitur a sociis means “[i]t is known from its associates.” 
Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 658 (cited in 
note 1) (brackets in original). Thus, when a statute contains a list of two or more words, 
courts are to give each word in the list a meaning that is consistent with the meaning of 
other words in the list. See Singer and Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 47:16 at 353–59 (cited in note 28); Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation 
and Regulation at 658–59 (cited in note 1). 
 29 See Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 643 
(cited in note 1). 
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have been accused of playing a much more determinative role in 
the Court’s statutory cases.30 
Perhaps the most famous substantive canon is the rule of 
lenity, which holds that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant.31 A close second is the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, which holds that if there are two or 
more plausible readings of a statute, and one of these raises se-
rious constitutional concerns, the Court should adopt the read-
ing that avoids the constitutional problem.32 Other well-known 
substantive canons include: the rule that waivers of sovereign 
immunity should be narrowly construed,33 a rule requiring a 
“clear statement” before a federal statute may be read to intrude 
in areas traditionally regulated by states,34 a rule that ambigui-
ties in statutes dealing with Indian tribes are to be resolved in 
favor of the tribes,35 a rule that statutes in derogation of the 
common law are to be narrowly construed,36 a rule that remedial 
 
 30 See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 13 & n 53 (cited in note 26). 
 31 See Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 3 Statutes and Statutory Construc-
tion § 59:3 at 167–75 (Thomson Reuters/West 7th ed 2008); United States v Wiltberger, 18 
US (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820) (describing the rule as “perhaps not much less old than con-
struction itself”); Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 
693–96 (cited in note 1). 
 32 See, for example, Rapanos v United States, 547 US 715, 737–38 & n 9 (2006) 
(Scalia) (plurality); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building & Con-
struction Trades Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988); United States v Delaware and Hudson 
Co, 213 US 366, 407–08 (1909). See also Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene 
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory In-
terpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal L Rev 397, 399–401 (2005); Schauer, 1995 
S Ct Rev at 83 (cited in note 9); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional 
Doubts: The Supreme Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 
UC Davis L Rev 1, 88–90 (1996); Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 45 (cited in note 9); 
Posner, The Federal Courts at 285 (cited in note 9); Wellington, 1961 S Ct Rev at 67–71 
(cited in note 9). 
 33 See, for example, Federal Aviation Administration v Cooper, 132 S Ct 1441, 1453 
(2012); United States v White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 US 465, 472 (2003); United 
States v Nordic Village, Inc, 503 US 30, 33–34 (1992). 
 34 See, for example, Rapanos, 547 US at 737–38 (Scalia) (plurality); BFP v Resolu-
tion Trust Corp, 511 US 531, 544 (1994); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460–61 (1991). 
 35 See, for example, Carcieri v Salazar, 555 US 379, 413–14 (2009) (Stevens dis-
senting); Montana v Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 US 759, 766–68 (1985). 
 36 See, for example, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v Chesapeake & 
Potomac Telephone Co of Virginia, 464 US 30, 35–36 (1983); Robert C. Herd & Co, Inc v 
Krawill Machinery Corp, 359 US 297, 304–05 (1959). 
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statutes are to be construed liberally,37 and a rule that interpre-
tive doubts should be resolved in favor of veterans.38 
As the above list illustrates, substantive canons come in many 
varieties. Most take one of three forms: (1) “presumptions,” or 
“rules of thumb that cut across different types of statutes” and 
“that the Court will ‘presume’ Congress intends to incorporate 
into statutes”;39 (2) “liberal” or “strict” construction canons, 
which direct courts to read statutes dealing with certain subject 
areas either expansively or narrowly;40 and (3) “clear statement 
rules,” which require a clear statement on the face of the statute 
in order to rebut a policy presumption the Court has created.41 
The next Section discusses prevailing scholarly assumptions 
about how these policy-based canons operate. 
A. The Prevailing Wisdom 
Statutory interpretation scholars of widely divergent philos-
ophies tend to converge in several respects in their views about 
substantive canons. They agree, for example, that textualist 
judges employ substantive canons regularly42 and, at the same 
time, that there is significant theoretical tension between sub-
stantive canons and textualism.43 Implicit in these two points of 
convergence are two additional assumptions—that substantive 
canons play a significant role in the interpretation of statutes 
 
 37 See, for example, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co v Buell, 480 US 557, 
562 (1987); Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 US 332, 336 (1967). 
 38 See, for example, King v St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 US 215, 220 n 9 (1991). 
 39 Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 691 (cited 
in note 1). 
 40 See id at 690–91. 
 41 Id at 692 (emphasis omitted). 
 42 See, for example, Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1542–43 (cited in note 2); 
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 
Colum L Rev 1648, 1655 (2001) (describing textualists’ use of “constitutionally inspired 
clear statement rules”); Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1758 (cited in note 20) (contending that 
textualist judges “widely employ the substantive canons”); Mank, 86 Ky L J at 552 (cited 
in note 6) (arguing that textualists “frequently” employ federalism clear statement 
rules); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L Rev 914, 929 (2012) (noting that 
“textualist judges are particularly fond of clear statement rules”). 
 43 See, for example, Barrett, 90 BU L Rev at 121–25 (cited in note 3); Jim Chen, 
Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 Wash U L Q 1263, 1303 (1995) (“[T]he new 
textualism consistently undermines its stated right-branching approach by its increasing 
reliance on clear statement rules and other constitutionally informed substantive can-
ons.”); Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 28 (cited in note 2) (“To the honest textualist, 
all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of trouble.”); Manning, 101 Colum 
L Rev at 125–26 (cited in note 1). 
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and that their effect is to displace legislative policy preferences 
with judicial ones.44 
On one side of the statutory interpretation divide, pragma-
tist Professor Eskridge has posited that “a textualism refusing 
to consider the legislative context of statutes is going to be 
tempted not only to rely on substantive canons, but also to de-
velop them, common law style.”45 He and others have observed 
that, despite criticizing substantive canons in theory, leading 
textualist Justice Scalia “not only cites but heavily relies on 
these ‘substantive’ canons” when deciding cases.46 Eskridge ar-
gued that this textualist reliance on substantive canons is prob-
lematic, because it allows judges to elide statutory language and 
to invent or adjust the rules that govern statutory construction 
as they go along.47 
On the opposite side of the interpretive divide, textualist 
scholar Professor John Manning has made similar observations. 
Manning has noted, for example, that devices like the avoidance 
canon and clear statement rules “mitigate the textualists’ strict 
focus on the conventional meaning of the enacted text.”48 Fur-
ther, he has acknowledged that these canons are in tension with 
“the most basic textualist assumptions” and that some textualists 
or textualist-sympathetic judges “have recognized the necessity 
 
 44 Scholarly views regarding language canons have been more mixed. Some schol-
ars have argued that, like substantive canons, language canons are used to frustrate or 
undermine legislative intent. See James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency versus Ordinary 
Meaning Advocacy, 57 SLU L J 975, 983 (2013), citing generally Brudney and Ditslear, 
58 Vand L Rev 1 (cited in note 26). Others have argued that language canons approxi-
mate the way Congress drafts and, therefore, that their use fulfills legislative intent. 
See, for example, Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 383–84 (2005) 
(arguing that canons like noscitur a sociis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius reflect 
the “likely intent of the enacting legislature”). See also Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 
at 25–26 (cited in note 2) (describing language canons such as noscitur a sociis and 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius as “commonsensical”); Gluck and Bressman, 65 
Stan L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 25) (reporting that a study of congressional staffers 
revealed that the majority of them believed that the assumptions underlying the noscitur 
a sociis and ejusdem generis canons “always or often” apply). 
 45 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545 (cited in note 2). 
 46 Id at 1512 n 9. See also, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance 
and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 S Ct Rev 181, 186. 
 47 See Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545–46 (cited in note 2) (“[A]s 
new canons are created or strengthened and old ones narrowed as Supreme Court com-
position changes, the honest textualist becomes just as unpredictable as, and may even 
come to resemble, her doppelganger the willful judge.”). 
 48 Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1). See also Manning, 101 Colum 
L Rev at 1655 (cited in note 42). 
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for restrained application of such tools of construction.”49 In ad-
dition, although Manning has defended certain substantive can-
ons as reflecting “established background conventions,” he has 
conceded that when textualists create new substantive canons, 
they should be forced to justify their reliance on such interpre-
tive tools.50 
Other scholars with less clearly staked-out jurisprudential 
philosophies have echoed these assumptions as well. Professor 
Amanda Frost has noted that “textualist judges are particularly 
fond of clear statement rules, which aid them in interpreting 
ambiguous statutes without the need to resort to legislative his-
tory.”51 And Professor Amy Coney Barrett has argued that textu-
alists “embrace” many substantive canons, including the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, the rule of lenity, and several clear 
statement rules.52 
In addition, numerous commentators writing over a wide 
time span have maintained that judges use substantive canons 
strategically, to effect judicial policy preferences at the expense 
of legislative intent.53 Speaking broadly about both substantive 
and language canons, British jurisprude Sir Frederick Pollock 
complained more than a century ago that canons “cannot well be 
accounted for except on the theory that Parliament generally 
changes the law for the worse, and that the business of the judges 
is to keep the mischief of its interference within the narrowest 
possible bounds.”54 More recently, Eskridge has argued that 
Scalia used substantive canons selectively and arbitrarily, and 
in a manner that was less constraining than interpretive ap-
proaches that consider legislative history and intent.55 
Scalia himself characterized at least some substantive can-
ons as “a sheer judicial power-grab”56 and called all substantive 
 
 49 Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1). 
 50 Id at 125–26. 
 51 Frost, 59 UCLA L Rev at 929 (cited in note 42). 
 52 Barrett, 90 BU L Rev at 121–23 (cited in note 3). 
 53 See, for example, Ross, 45 Vand L Rev at 563 (cited in note 27) (arguing that 
substantive canons “clearly reflect judicial, not congressional, policy concerns”); Edward 
L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Re-
sponse to Farber and Ross, 45 Vand L Rev 579, 590 (1992). 
 54 Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics 85 (Macmillan 1882). See 
also James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation”, 43 Harv L Rev 886, 890–91 
(1930) (criticizing the use of the canons of interpretation over legislative history). 
 55 See Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 676 (cited in note 7). 
 56 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 2). 
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canons “a lot of trouble” to “the honest textualist.”57 He de-
scribed substantive canons as “indeterminate,” leading to the 
“unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of judicial deci-
sions.”58 He also questioned “where the courts get the authority 
to impose them,” doubting whether courts can “really just decree 
that [they] will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean 
less or more than what they fairly say.”59 
Commentators also seem to agree that there is tension be-
tween substantive canons and legislative history, and that as 
conservative justices have come to dominate the Supreme Court, 
there has been a trend toward increasing reliance on substan-
tive canons and diminishing reliance on legislative history. 
Judge Patricia Wald, for example, has observed that “legislative 
history is often rejected in favor of, or at least filtered through, 
canons, presumptions, or principles considered overriding by a 
majority of the Court.”60 Professor Charles Tiefer similarly has 
argued that textualists have “strengthen[ed] [ ] substantive can-
ons along grounds of dispensing with legislative history.”61 More 
recently, Professors James Brudney and Corey Ditslear’s study 
of Supreme Court canon use in employment law cases found 
that, in closely decided cases, there was a “distinctly conserva-
tive influence associated with substantive canon reliance.”62 
Brudney and Ditslear identified a subset of cases in which the 
majority opinion relied on canons (language or substantive), 
while the dissenting opinion relied on legislative history.63 In 
short, the picture painted by statutory interpretation scholars has 
been of a Court dominated by conservative justices who regularly 
employ substantive canons and rarely consult legislative history, 
and of a liberal minority who infrequently invoke substantive 
canons but continue to consult legislative history regularly. 
At first blush, the prevailing scholarly wisdom seems un-
impeachable. Some prominent substantive canons blatantly 
are designed to contravene congressional intent, or at least to 
 
 57 Id at 28. 
 58 Id (“[I]t is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is 
added, on one or the other side of the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.”). 
 59 Id at 28–29. 
 60 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 207 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 61 Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme 
Court, 2000 Wis L Rev 205, 220 (emphasis added). 
 62 Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 6 (cited in note 26). 
 63 See id at 77–79. For a fuller discussion of their findings, see Part I.B. 
KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017 11:25 AM 
2017] Reconsidering Substantive Canons 839 
 
impose default rules that penalize Congress for imprecise draft-
ing. The rule of lenity, for example, dictates that doubts about 
whether particular conduct is covered by a criminal statute 
should be resolved in favor of criminal defendants, even though 
members of Congress tend to take a “tough on crime” stance and 
likely would prefer to resolve such close calls in favor of the gov-
ernment.64 Similarly, federalism clear statement rules impose a 
default rule that preserves state power at the expense of federal 
power, deliberately setting a high bar for congressional efforts to 
intrude on state rights—even though members of Congress 
would likely prefer that such doubts be resolved in favor of the 
federal rule.65 But despite the intent-defeating design of some 
substantive canons, doctrinal analysis of the cases studied in 
this Article suggests that substantive canons often are used in 
tandem with, or to further, legislative intent, rather than to 
frustrate it.66 
B. Prior Studies 
There is only one study to date that has examined the sub-
stantive canons as a set, rather than focusing on one or a hand-
ful of specific such canons. That study, published in 1992 by 
Eskridge and Professor Philip Frickey, reviewed the Supreme 
Court’s substantive canon use during the last eleven years of the 
Burger Court and the first five years of the Rehnquist Court.67 
Eskridge and Frickey posited that, rather than deciding cases 
based on what a substantive canon dictates, the Court shapes 
and even invents canons to fit the results it reaches in individual 
cases.68 That is, substantive canons play an important role in the 
way the Court expresses or justifies the “value choices” it is em-
ploying when it construes a statute, but they do not dictate or 
produce outcomes; rather, outcomes produce canons.69 As evi-
dence in support of their view, Eskridge and Frickey reported 
that a comparison of the Court’s behavior during the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, and even during different periods within the 
 
 64 Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 957 (cited in note 25). 
 65 See id at 944 (reporting the results of a survey showing that congressional staffers 
predicted that courts interpreting ambiguities in federal statutes relating to preemption 
would favor the reach of federal law). 
 66 See Part II.C. 
 67 See Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 596 (cited in note 7). 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. 
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Burger Court, revealed “striking differences both in the canons 
the Court invokes and in the way in which the canons are in-
voked.”70 They argued that this makes sense because, if outcomes 
produce canons, we can expect that “different Courts will express 
their different ideologies by emphasizing, or even creating, differ-
ent substantive canons in the complex work of statutory interpre-
tation.”71 Indeed, Eskridge and Frickey’s article focused on the 
Court’s creation of several new federalism-protecting clear state-
ment rules during the 1980s.72 Specifically, they observed that 
“[t]he Court not only created new canons reflecting federalism-
based values, but also transformed some of the existing clear 
statement rules into super-strong clear statement rules.”73 And 
they took this invention and reinvention of substantive canons 
to be par for the course, rather than a development unique to 
the federalism clear statement rules or to the particular period 
they studied.74 
In a later article, Eskridge further observed that during the 
period between 1987 and 1994, the Rehnquist Court employed 
“no fewer than seventy-nine different” substantive canons in 
statutory cases.75 He also pointed out that “Scalia joined or wrote 
the Court’s opinion in almost all of the cases where the Court in-
voked or revised these substantive canons.”76 As Part II elabo-
rates, I found considerably less variety in the number of sub-
stantive canons employed by the Roberts Court between 2006 
and 2012 and low rates of substantive canon reliance in the 
opinions authored by Scalia.77 
Although not focused on substantive canons, Brudney and 
Ditslear’s study of the Supreme Court’s workplace law cases also 
provides some important background for this Article. In particular, 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 596 (cited in note 7). 
 72 The article is best known for its elaboration of the quasi-constitutional nature of 
these federalism clear statement rules and for the authors’ normative critique of such 
rules. See id at 619–29, 640–45. 
 73 Id at 619. 
 74 See id at 596 (asserting that the substantive canons are “constructed, and recon-
structed, over time”). 
 75 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2), citing William N. 
Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 101–08 (1994). 
 76 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added). 
 77 See Parts II.B.1–2. Similarly, Scalia joined a majority (fifty of eighty-seven), but 
nowhere near all, of the opinions in which the Court invoked a substantive canon. See 
Table 4. 
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the Brudney-Ditslear study reinforces several prevailing as-
sumptions about the relationship among substantive canons, 
ideology, and congressional intent. As noted above, Brudney and 
Ditslear identified a subset of 10 closely divided cases (out of 148 
total closely divided cases) in which the majority opinion relied 
on substantive canons but not legislative history, while the dis-
sent invoked legislative history to support its position.78 In nine 
of these cases, the majority opinion applied a substantive canon 
to reach a conservative result, while the dissenting opinion re-
lied on legislative history to reach a liberal result.79 Based on 
these and related findings, Brudney and Ditslear concluded that 
“this polarized pattern suggests that for an identifiable subset of 
divisive cases, the canons are being used by the Rehnquist Court 
to help produce a judicially desired set of policies, ignoring or 
sacrificing legislatively expressed preferences in the process.”80 
Although Brudney and Ditslear’s study involved a relatively 
small number of cases, the conclusions Brudney and Ditslear 
drew are consistent with prevailing views that substantive can-
ons operate to undermine congressional intent. As discussed in 
Part II, my study of the Roberts Court suggests that these con-
clusions may be overstated and that, at least in some cases, the 
Court seeks to use substantive canons to honor congressional 
intent. 
Both the Eskridge-Frickey and the Brudney-Ditslear studies 
appear to have assumed that when substantive canons were in-
voked, they played a meaningful role in the Court’s statutory 
constructions. The evidence reported in the next Part provides 
some reason to question that assumption and affords a more 
complete picture of how individual justices compare in their use 
of substantive canons. 
II.  THE DATA 
A. Methodology 
The findings and conclusions presented below are based on 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of all decisions in the 
Roberts Court’s 2005 (post–January 31, 200681) through 2011 
 
 78 Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 53, 78–79 (cited in note 26). 
 79 See id at 78–79. 
 80 Id at 79. 
 81 This is the date that Justice Alito joined the Court. 
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terms that confronted a question of statutory interpretation.82 
Every case decided during that period was examined through 
the Supreme Court’s online database to determine whether it 
dealt with a statutory issue.83 Any case in which the Court’s opin-
ion contained a substantial discussion about statutory meaning 
was included in the study. Cases interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), 
or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) were not in-
cluded,84 but a handful of constitutional cases in which the Court 
construed the meaning of a federal statute before deciding the 
constitutional question were included.85 This selection methodol-
ogy yielded 296 statutory cases over six and a half terms, with 
296 majority or plurality opinions, 115 concurring opinions, 172 
dissenting opinions, 18 part-concurring/part-dissenting opinions, 
and 2 part-majority/part-concurring opinions, for a total of 603 
opinions. Of these 296 cases, 138 cases were decided unanimously, 
and 158 were decided by a divided vote.86 
 
 82 This time period was not chosen for any particular reason; the time-intensive 
nature of data collection led to a decision to end with the 2011 term. 
 83 For most cases, this process consisted of examining the syllabus for the case; in a 
few cases, the entire case was read. 
 84 I made this judgment call because the FRCP, FRE, and FRCrP are created in a 
manner that differs significantly from federal statutes—they are drafted by judges rather 
than Congress and do not require the president’s approval. See 28 USC § 2072(a) (grant-
ing the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure 
and rules of evidence for cases” in federal courts); How the Rulemaking Process Works: 
Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public (Administrative Office of the US Courts), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/DEB3-7QT6 (explaining the current process for amending the 
federal rules). Accordingly, several of the interpretive tools available when construing 
statutes—for example, legislative history, intent, the whole-act rule, and other stat-
utes—are not available with respect to the federal rules or provide a very different kind 
of context, from a very different perspective, when used to construe the federal rules. 
 85 In such cases, the opinion was coded as unanimous, close margin, or wide margin 
based on the justices’ votes regarding the statutory interpretation question only; thus, if 
the justices agreed unanimously that the statute should be read to mean X, but then 
split 5–4 regarding the constitutional validity of the statute, the opinion was coded as 
unanimous. See generally, for example, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District 
Number One v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009) (holding unanimously, on statutory grounds, 
that all political subdivisions are entitled to seek relief from their preclearance obliga-
tions under the Voting Rights Act, while also deciding, by a vote of 8–1, to employ the 
canon of constitutional avoidance to refrain from determining the constitutionality of a 
section of that act). 
 86 This figure counts as unanimous all decisions in which there was no dissenting 
opinion, even if concurring opinions offering different rationales were issued. By com-
parison, for the 2006 through 2011 terms, the overall number of unanimously decided 
cases (including both statutory and constitutional cases) was 186, and the number of 
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In coding and analyzing these cases, my primary goal was to 
determine the frequency with which the Court referenced differ-
ent interpretive sources when giving meaning to federal stat-
utes. The cases in the study were examined for references to the 
following interpretive tools: (1) statutory text, including appeals 
to plain meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) grammar rules; 
(4) the whole-act rule; (5) other federal and state statutes; 
(6) common law; (7) substantive canons; (8) Supreme Court 
precedent; (9) statutory purpose; (10) practical consequences; 
(11) legislative intent; (12) legislative history; (13) language 
canons such as expressio unius; and (14) references to some form 
of agency deference.87 
For purposes of this study, “substantive canons” were de-
fined as background constitutional or policy norms, rules, or 
presumptions about how statutes should be interpreted, includ-
ing rules about how statutes in a particular subject area should 
be construed. Coders were instructed to identify the specific sub-
stantive canon being invoked.88 
The interpretive resources coded for in this study are con-
sistent with those that have been examined in other empirical 
studies of the Court’s statutory interpretation practices.89 A few 
differences in definitions used for the different sources were in-
evitable and are pointed out when notable. For example, some 
early empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory cases 
lumped language and substantive canons together under the 
 
divided-vote cases was 278. For access to the data, see Stat Pack Archive (SCOTUSblog), 
available at http://perma.cc/4T5G-8L3L. 
 87 In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I and at least one research assistant 
separately read and analyzed each opinion and separately recorded the use of each in-
terpretive resource. In the event of disagreement, I reviewed the case and made the final 
determination as to how a particular interpretive resource should be coded. For a de-
tailed explanation of my coding methodology, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory In-
terpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 
Hastings L J 221, 291–96 (2010). 
 88 For a list of all cases in the data set that were identified as invoking a substan-
tive canon and the substantive canon(s) invoked, see Appendix. For additional discussion 
of the methodology and what constitutes a substantive canon, see note 148 and accom-
panying text. 
 89 See, for example, Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism 
in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History 
Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan L Rev 1, 11–12 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Au-
thority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex L Rev 1073, 1088–90 
(1992); Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 142–48 
(Stanford 2009). 
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heading “canons of construction,” rather than measuring refer-
ences to these different forms of canons separately, as I did.90 
In recording the Court’s reliance on particular interpretive 
tools, I counted only references that reflected substantive judi-
cial reliance on the tool in reaching an interpretation. When an 
opinion mentioned a substantive canon but rejected it as inap-
plicable or not controlling,91 I did not count that as a substantive 
canon reference. Similarly, I did not count instances in which 
the Court merely acknowledged, but did not accept, a litigant’s 
argument that a particular canon or tool dictated a particular 
result.92 
Secondary or corroborative references to an interpretive 
tool, on the other hand, were counted; thus, when the Court 
reached an interpretation based primarily on one interpretive 
source but went on to note that x, y, and z interpretive tools fur-
ther supported that interpretation, the references to x, y, and z 
were coded along with the primarily-relied-upon source.93 
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and 
each case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin, 
or wide margin (cases with six or more justices in the majority). 
Each justice’s vote in each case also was recorded, as was the 
author of each opinion. This methodology was the same as that 
followed in my previous empirical studies.94 
The ideological direction of each opinion also was recorded. 
It is difficult to code case outcomes for ideology because it is not 
 
 90 See, for example, Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 11–12 (cited in note 89). 
 91 See, for example, United States v Stevens, 559 US 460, 481 (2010) (declining to 
apply the canon of constitutional avoidance). 
 92 An example may help illustrate. In Barber v Thomas, 560 US 474 (2010), the ma-
jority opinion considered whether the phrase “term of imprisonment” in a statute allow-
ing good-time credit for good behavior by prisoners applies to the time actually served by 
the prisoner, or the time the prisoner was sentenced to serve. Id at 483–84. The majority 
held that the phrase referred to the time actually served; in so ruling, it rejected a rule of 
lenity argument invoked by the petitioner and the dissent, concluding that the rule was 
inapplicable because the statute was unambiguous. Id at 488. See also id at 500–01 
(Kennedy dissenting). The opinion was not coded for reliance on a substantive canon. 
 93 For example, in Reynolds v United States, 132 S Ct 975 (2012), the Court held 
that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act does not require pre-Act offend-
ers (convicted before the Act took effect) to register or update their registrations before 
the attorney general specifies that the Act’s registration requirements apply to them. Id 
at 984. The majority opinion relied primarily on the “natural” meaning of the Act’s text, 
and also mentioned the rule of lenity in a passing parenthetical. Id at 980, 982. The opin-
ion was coded for references to text / plain meaning and substantive canons. 
 94 See Krishnakumar, 62 Hastings L J at 231–33 (cited in note 87); Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 Duke L J 909, 921–26 (2016). 
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always clear whether an outcome favoring a particular litigant 
is liberal or conservative, and coders necessarily must make 
judgment calls. In order to minimize errors and to make this 
study as replicable as possible, I coded for ideology by importing 
the ideological-direction coding from Professor Harold Spaeth’s 
Supreme Court Database for the cases in my data set.95 
Finally, every opinion in which a substantive canon was in-
voked was coded as containing “passing reliance,” “some reli-
ance,” or “primary reliance” on the substantive canon. While this 
coding necessarily involved some judgment calls, I believe that it 
adds valuable texture to our understanding of how the Court uses 
substantive canons when it chooses to invoke them. In any 
event, my data are available for others to review and agree or 
disagree with.96 The coding parameters for reliance were as fol-
lows: An opinion was coded as containing “passing reliance” on a 
substantive canon if it made minimal reference to the canon, or 
mentioned it as a fallback or add-on argument supporting a 
reading already arrived at through other interpretive tools. An 
opinion was coded as involving “some reliance” on a substantive 
canon if it made more than minimal reference to the canon, but 
did not rely on the substantive canon as the main justification 
for the construction it adopted. Finally, an opinion was coded as 
containing “primary reliance” if it relied primarily on a substan-
tive canon to justify the result reached. 
A few examples should help illustrate how these judgment 
calls were made. In Exxon Shipping Co v Baker,97 for instance, 
the Court considered whether the Clean Water Act’s98 water pol-
lution penalties preempt punitive damages awards in maritime 
spill cases.99 The Court concluded that the Act does not preempt 
punitive damages awards, based primarily on the statute’s 
text.100 The Court also commented that it saw no clear indica-
tion of congressional intent to preempt such awards and made 
a passing reference—in a parenthetical—to the rule that a 
statute must clearly state its intent to abrogate a common-law 
 
 95 See The Supreme Court Database (Washington University Law), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3DL8-4K2W. 
 96 See Appendix. 
 97 554 US 471 (2008). 
 98 Federal Water Pollution Acts Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 
816, codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. 
 99 Exxon, 554 US at 481. 
 100 See id at 488–89. 
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principle.101 This case was coded as containing “passing” reli-
ance on a substantive canon. By contrast, in Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder102 
(“NAMUDNO”), the Supreme Court employed the avoidance 
canon to adopt a strained reading of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965103 (VRA)—concluding that a Texas utility district counted 
as a “political subdivision” eligible for bailout from the preclear-
ance requirement of VRA § 5—in order to avoid thorny questions 
about the constitutionality of § 5’s preclearance formula.104 
NAMUDNO was coded as involving “primary reliance” on a sub-
stantive canon.105 Finally, in Begay v United States,106 the Court 
held that the offense of driving under the influence (DUI) does 
not count as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act of 1984.107 Justice Scalia agreed and authored a concurring 
opinion that relied on the statutory text, the whole-act rule, and 
a dictionary definition to conclude that the proper test for de-
termining whether an offense is a “violent felony” is whether the 
offense “pose[s] at least as serious a risk of physical injury to an-
other as burglary.”108 His concurring opinion then stated that 
drunk driving could not clearly be said to pose “at least as serious 
a risk of physical injury to another as burglary” and that the rule 
of lenity therefore required him to find in favor of the defen-
dant.109 Scalia’s concurrence in Begay was coded as containing 
“some reliance”—that is, more than “passing reliance” but less 
than “primary reliance”—on a substantive canon. 
 
 101 See id at 489. 
 102 557 US 193 (2009). 
 103 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10301 et seq. 
 104 NAMUDNO, 557 US at 196–97. 
 105 For additional examples of “primary reliance” cases, see generally Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v Murphy, 548 US 291 (2006) (using a federalism 
clear statement canon to hold that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) does not allow recovery of expert fees from states); Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 
124 (2007) (using the avoidance canon to find that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
does not prohibit standard “dilation and evacuation” procedures); Florida Department of 
Revenue v Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc, 554 US 33 (2008) (using a federalism clear state-
ment canon to construe the Bankruptcy Code’s stamp tax exemption to not apply to 
transactions before a plan is confirmed under Chapter 11). 
 106 553 US 137 (2008). 
 107 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified as amended at 18 USC § 924(e). For the 
Court’s holding, see Begay, 553 US at 139. 
 108 Begay, 553 US at 148–53 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 109 Id at 153 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
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B. Substantive Canon Statistics 
Before reporting the data, it is important to note some lim-
itations of this study. First, the study covers only six and a half 
Supreme Court terms and only 296 statutory interpretation 
cases, decided by some combination of the same eleven justices. 
While this data set is large enough to reveal some things about 
the Supreme Court’s use of substantive canons, the data reported 
may reflect trends specific to the Roberts Court. Second, great 
significance should not be placed on the precise percentages re-
ported; the number of cases reviewed is large enough to provide 
some valuable insights, but the focus should be on the patterns 
that emerge rather than on specific percentages. Third, in noting 
the weight, or intensity, of an opinion’s reliance on a substantive 
canon, I make no claims to have discovered the justices’ underly-
ing, or “true,” motivations for deciding a statutory case; the data 
do not reveal whether a particular opinion relied heavily on a 
substantive canon because the opinion’s author was persuaded 
by the canon, or merely because the author thought the canon 
was a convincing interpretive tool. The study’s empirical and 
doctrinal claims are confined to describing how the justices pub-
licly engage the substantive canons as justifications for their 
statutory constructions and to theorizing about discernable pat-
terns in their public engagement of such canons. 
1. Frequency and weight. 
Table 1 reports the frequency with which the members of 
the Roberts Court referenced substantive canons—and other in-
terpretive canons or tools of construction—in the opinions they 
authored during the Court’s 2005 through 2011 terms.110 For 
seven of the eleven justices, the rates of reference to substantive 
canons are low, roughly at or below 15.0 percent.111 As Table 1 
shows, this compares to much higher rates of reference, across 
justices, for almost every other interpretive tool.112 Even the 
three most frequent users of substantive canons, Justices John 
Paul Stevens, John Roberts, and Sonia Sotomayor, employed 
such canons in no more than 25.0 percent of the opinions they 
 
 110 See Table 1. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
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authored.113 Indeed, out of the eleven interpretive tools listed in 
Table 1, substantive canons were among the least frequently in-
voked. Only common law exhibited similarly low rates of refer-
ence across the board.114 While some of the justices referenced 
legislative intent at low rates as well, several others invoked in-
tent at much higher rates (above 20.0 percent).115 
 
 113 See id. 
 114 See Table 1 (reporting rates of reference for “Common Law” precedent ranging 
from 0 percent to 17.6 percent). One important caveat: my study did not count references 
to agency deference, such as the Chevron doctrine, as substantive canon references—
such references instead were coded as reliance on an independent interpretive resource 
(agency deference). See Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 
467 US 837, 842–43 (1984). This is consistent with how most other empirical studies of 
the US Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation practices have treated references to 
agency deference. See, for example, Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 33–34 (cited in note 89) 
(coding judicial invocations of “Chevron-style deference” as references to “administrative 
materials”); Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at 144 (cited in 
note 89) (coding reliance on Chevron doctrine as a form of “deference to the executive 
branch”); Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 23–24 (cited in note 26) (coding “agency 
deference” separately from “substantive canons”). But see Connor N. Raso and William N. 
Eskridge Jr, Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Moti-
vates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum L Rev 1727, 1734–35 (2010) (calling 
agency deference doctrines a form of substantive canon); Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L 
Rev at 940 (cited in note 25). My study also did not count citations to the canon against 
implied repeals or the rule that specific provisions trump general ones as substantive 
canons because legislation scholars consider these to be textual integrity or whole-code 
canons. See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, John A. Garver Professor of Juris-
prudence, Yale Law School, E-mail to Anita S. Krishnakumar (Oct 30, 2015) (“Eskridge 
E-mail”) (on file with author). 
 115 See Table 1. 
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TABLE 1.  RATES OF RELIANCE ON INTERPRETIVE CANONS AND 
TOOLS BY OPINION AUTHOR 
(N=584) 
 
   
 
  Percentages reported in each row represent the number of opinions authored by 
each justice that invoked the listed interpretive canon, divided by the total number of 
statutory interpretation opinions each justice authored (that total number is reported 
below each justice’s name, as n=X). 
  The total number of opinions reflected in the Table is 584, rather than 603, be-
cause the Table omits 19 per curiam opinions issued during the period studied. 
 * Indicates that a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, using the Bonferroni 
multiple comparison method, reveals a significant difference between rates of reliance by 
different justices in the opinions they authored at p < 0.05. (For Text / Plain Meaning 
p=0.000; for Practical Consequences p=0.0091; for Purpose p=0.000; for Intent p=0.000; 
and for Legislative History p=0.0001.) In other words, for these particular interpretive 
tools, the patterns or differences in rates of reference across justices were less than 5.0 
percent likely to have occurred merely by chance. 
Canons / 
Interpretive 
Tools 
Thomas 
(n=77) 
Scalia 
(n=82) 
Alito 
(n=58) 
Roberts 
(n=41) 
Kennedy 
(n=46) 
Breyer 
(n=80) 
Kagan 
(n=14) 
Souter 
(n=35) 
Ginsburg 
(n=57) 
Sotomayor 
(n=34) 
Stevens 
(n=60) 
Supreme 
Court 
Precedent 
54.5% 40.2% 43.1% 58.5% 60.9% 50.0% 42.9% 54.3% 47.4% 70.6% 55.0% 
Text / Plain 
Meaning* 62.3% 56.1% 48.3% 48.8% 47.8% 26.3% 57.1% 45.7% 28.1% 47.1% 43.3% 
Dictionary 
Rule 24.7% 19.5% 29.3% 14.6% 26.1% 15.0% 35.7% 17.1% 14.0% 26.5% 16.7% 
Combined 
Language 
Canons / 
Whole-Act 
Rule 
42.9% 28.0% 36.2% 51.2% 30.4% 18.8% 50.0% 31.4% 29.8% 52.9% 25.0% 
Other 
Statutes 16.9% 23.2% 31.0% 26.8% 21.7% 18.8% 7.1% 22.9% 22.8% 26.5% 16.7% 
Common Law 9.0% 14.6% 17.2% 17.1% 4.3% 8.8% 0.0% 14.3% 5.3% 17.6% 16.7% 
Substantive 
Canons 11.7% 11.0% 13.8% 22.0% 15.2% 11.3% 14.3% 14.3% 15.8% 17.6% 25.0% 
Practical 
Consequences* 16.9% 30.5% 37.9% 31.7% 45.7% 43.8% 21.4% 31.4% 42.1% 44.1% 30.0% 
Purpose* 14.3% 11.0% 22.4% 12.2% 45.7% 41.3% 50.0% 17.1% 33.3% 38.2% 30.0% 
Intent* 5.2% 4.9% 17.2% 7.3% 6.5% 21.3% 14.3% 22.9% 21.1% 26.5% 41.7% 
Legislative 
History* 7.8% 9.8% 20.7% 12.2% 26.1% 43.8% 28.6% 28.6% 29.8% 52.9% 38.3% 
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Table 2 provides a slightly different comparison of the rates 
at which the members of the Roberts Court referenced substan-
tive canons, relative to other interpretive tools, as a percentage 
of all opinions issued during the period studied. 
TABLE 2.  OVERALL ROBERTS COURT RATES OF RELIANCE ON 
INTERPRETIVE CANONS AND TOOLS: 
2005–2011 TERMS 
 
Like the data in Table 1, the data in Table 2 reveal that 
substantive canons were infrequently invoked in the Court’s 
statutory cases (14.4 percent of all opinions). Also as in Table 1, 
substantive canons were the Court’s second-least-frequently-
used interpretive resource overall, behind only the common 
law.116 This raw rate is not shocking in itself; Professors Brudney 
and Ditslear’s study of workplace law cases found similarly low 
 
 † The percentages reported in each column represent the number of cases that refer-
enced an interpretive tool divided by the total number of opinions of that type (majority, 
dissenting, etc.) authored in cases presenting a statutory interpretation question. Per 
curiam opinions, which were excluded from Table 1, are counted as majority opinions 
for the purposes of this Table. 
 116 See Table 2. Common-law precedent was referenced in 11.4 percent of all opinions. 
Canons / 
Interpretive Tools 
All 
Opinions† 
(n=603) 
Majority 
Opinions 
(n=296) 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
(n=172) 
Concurring 
Opinions 
(n=115) 
Partial 
Opinions 
(n=20) 
Supreme Court 
Precedent 52.6% 62.5% 48.3% 36.5% 35.0% 
Text / Plain Meaning  44.8% 54.1% 39.0% 33.0% 25.0% 
Dictionary Rule 19.9% 27.7% 14.5% 8.7% 15.0% 
Combined Language 
Canons /  
Whole-Act Rule 
32.3% 67.9% 25.0% 12.2% 25.0% 
Other Statutes  21.2% 33.4% 20.3% 5.2% 5.0% 
Common Law  11.4% 15.2% 6.4% 8.7% 15.0% 
Substantive Canons 14.4% 15.5% 18.0% 5.2% 5.0% 
Practical 
Consequences 33.7% 34.5% 44.2% 19.1% 15.0% 
Purpose 26.0% 28.0% 32.0% 12.2% 25.0% 
Intent 16.1% 15.2% 24.4% 7.8% 5.0% 
Legislative History 25.0% 27.0% 30.8% 10.4% 30.0% 
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overall rates of reference to substantive canons (15.6 percent of 
Rehnquist Court cases).117 What is new is the finding that such 
low rates of reference hold true across all statutory subject areas—
not just in cases involving employment law statutes—and the 
comparative data indicating that the Court invoked substantive 
canons far less often than it invoked almost all other interpre-
tive canons and tools. 
More striking, however, is what the data show about how 
infrequently textualist justices employed substantive canons in 
the statutory opinions they authored. Contrary to popular belief, 
the Court’s most prominent textualist, Scalia, referenced sub-
stantive canons in only 11.0 percent (nine of eighty-two) of the 
opinions he authored, and fellow textualist Justice Thomas did 
so in just 11.7 percent (nine of seventy-seven) of the opinions 
that he authored.118 Textualist-leaning Justice Alito119 exhibited 
similarly low rates of reference.120 Equally surprising is that the 
three most frequent users of substantive canons turned out to be 
Stevens, Roberts, and Sotomayor.121 This is unexpected, and 
turns the conventional wisdom about substantive canons on its 
head, because Stevens and Sotomayor are intentionalists, who 
regularly use legislative history to inform their statutory con-
structions—not textualist judges forced to turn to substantive 
canons to provide the context they lack because they refuse to 
consult legislative history.122 Part III discusses the implications 
of these findings in detail. 
The data also reveal some surprising information about the 
weight that the justices placed on substantive canons when they 
did invoke them. Table 3 reports how often the members of the 
Roberts Court placed “passing,” “some,” or “primary” reliance on 
substantive canons in the opinions in which they employed such 
canons. 
 
 117 See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26). 
 118 See Table 1. 
 119 See Smith, 108 Colum L Rev at 1887 & n 14 (cited in note 12). 
 120 See Table 1 (reporting a rate of 13.8 percent). 
 121 See id (reporting rates of reference of 25.0 percent, 22.0 percent, and 17.6 per-
cent, respectively). 
 122 See Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545 (cited in note 2) (“[A] textual-
ism refusing to consider the legislative context of statutes is going to be tempted . . . to 
rely on substantive canons.”); Frost, 59 UCLA L Rev at 929 (cited in note 42) 
(“[T]extualist judges are particularly fond of clear statement rules, which aid them in 
interpreting ambiguous statutes without the need to resort to legislative history.”). 
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TABLE 3.  RELATIVE WEIGHT PLACED ON SUBSTANTIVE CANONS 
  Passing Reliance 
(n=34) 
Some Reliance 
(n=28) 
Primary Reliance 
(n=25) 
All Opinions 
That Reference 
Substantive Canons (n=87) 
39.1% 
(34) 
32.2% 
(28) 
28.7% 
(25) 
Majority Opinions 
(n=49) 
30.6% 
(15) 
32.7% 
(16) 
36.7% 
(18) 
Concurring 
Opinions 
(n=6) 
50.0% 
(3) 
16.7% 
(1) 
33.3% 
(2) 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
(n=31) 
51.6% 
(16) 
35.5% 
(11) 
12.9% 
(4) 
Partial 
Opinions 
(n=1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
100.0% 
(1) 
 
Notably, the data show that the justices placed only “pass-
ing” or “some” reliance on substantive canons in 71.3 percent of 
the opinions that invoked such canons.123 Many of these opinions 
mentioned substantive canons only at the tail end, in a fleeting, 
throwaway fashion or as an alternative, “even if,” argument.124 
Others employed substantive canons as a secondary resource or 
 
 123 See Table 3 (demonstrating that sixty-two of the eighty-seven opinions that in-
voked a substantive canon did so in a passing or secondary manner). 
 124 See, for example, United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 528 (2008) (Stevens con-
curring in the judgment) (noting, in the last few sentences of the opinion, that “[t]his 
conclusion dovetails with what common sense and the rule of lenity would require”). For 
similar usages, see Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 
556 US 502, 565–67 (2009) (Breyer dissenting); CBOCS West, Inc v Humphries, 553 US 
442, 463 (2008) (Thomas dissenting); Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, 552 US 576, 
595 (2008) (Stevens dissenting); Dean v United States, 556 US 568, 581 (2009) (Stevens 
dissenting); Carachuri-Rosendo v Holder, 560 US 563, 581 (2010); Bilski v Kappos, 561 
US 593, 645 (2010) (Stevens concurring in the judgment); Carr v United States, 560 US 
438, 450 n 6 (2010); Fowler v United States, 563 US 668, 675–76 (2011); Kucana v Holder, 
558 US 233, 251 (2010); Exxon, 554 US at 489; Ali v Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 US 
214, 247 (2008) (Breyer dissenting); BP America Production Co v Burton, 549 US 84, 95–
96 (2006); Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC, 562 US 223, 267 n 15 (2011) (Sotomayor dissenting); 
James v United States, 550 US 192, 219 (2007) (Scalia dissenting). The substantive can-
ons used in each of these cases are listed in the Appendix. 
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interpretive aid.125 Ultimately, less than 30.0 percent of the 
substantive canon–invoking opinions in the data set relied 
“primarily,” or in a dispositive manner, on such canons.126 Thus, 
 
 125  See Table 3 (middle column). See also, for example, Knight v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 552 US 181, 192–95 (2008) (invoking, inter alia, a canon that the trus-
tee has the burden of establishing a trust’s entitlement to a tax deduction and holding 
that the trustee had not met that burden). For similar usages, see Altria Group, Inc v 
Good, 555 US 70, 77–80 (2008); Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 21–23 (2009) (Kennedy) 
(plurality); Hawaii v Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 US 163, 176 (2009); Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America v Whiting, 563 US 582, 594–600 (2011); 
Hamilton v Lanning, 560 US 505, 517 (2010); Hardt v Reliance Standard Life Insurance 
Co, 560 US 242, 252–56 (2010); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v Hanson, 550 US 511, 
514 (2007); Gonzalez v Thaler, 132 S Ct 641, 648–50 (2012); Howard Delivery Service, Inc 
v Zurich American Insurance Co, 547 US 651, 667–68 (2006); id at 669–70 (Kennedy dis-
senting); Microsoft Corp v AT&T Corp, 550 US 437, 454–56 (2007); PLIVA, Inc v Mensing, 
564 US 604, 621–23 (2011) (Thomas) (plurality); id at 634–38 (Sotomayor dissenting); 
Smith v Bayer Corp, 564 US 299, 306 (2011); Travelers Casualty & Surety Co of America 
v Pacific Gas & Electric Co, 549 US 443, 452–55 (2007); Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 565 
(2009); Begay, 553 US at 153–54 (Scalia concurring in the judgment); Barber, 560 US at 
500–01 (Kennedy dissenting); Dean, 556 US at 584–86 (Breyer dissenting); Jerman v 
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA, 559 US 573, 623 (2010) (Kennedy dis-
senting); Kawashima v Holder, 132 S Ct 1166, 1177 (2012) (Ginsburg dissenting); Riegel 
v Medtronic, Inc, 552 US 312, 334–35 (2008) (Ginsburg dissenting); Riley v Kennedy, 553 
US 406, 430 (2008) (Stevens dissenting); United States v Rodriquez, 553 US 377, 404–05 
(2008) (Souter dissenting); Vartelas v Holder, 132 S Ct 1479, 1494–96 (2012) (Scalia dis-
senting); Watters v Wachovia Bank, NA, 550 US 1, 32 (2007) (Stevens dissenting); Brown 
v Plata, 563 US 493, 531–33 (2011). The substantive canons used in each of these cases 
are listed in the Appendix. 
 126 See Table 3 (right column). See also, for example, Arlington Central, 548 US at 
296–300 (beginning the analysis by invoking the rule that “when Congress attaches con-
ditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds, the conditions must be set out ‘unambig-
uously,’” and finding that expert fees are not covered by the IDEA because the statute 
does not put the states on clear notice that they might be liable for such fees). For similar 
usages, see Mims v Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S Ct 740, 748–49 (2012); Federal 
Aviation Administration v Cooper, 132 S Ct 1441, 1453 (2012); Arizona v United States, 
132 S Ct 2492, 2524–25 (2012) (Alito concurring in part and dissenting in part); National 
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2594, 2607 (2012) (“NFIB”); 
Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 132 S Ct 1367, 1373 (2012); Vartelas, 132 S Ct 
at 1484; CompuCredit Corp v Greenwood, 132 S Ct 665, 675 (2012) (Sotomayor concur-
ring in the judgment); Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v 
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc, 563 US 776, 785–86 (2011); id at 802–03 (Breyer dissent-
ing); Holland v Florida, 560 US 631, 645–46 (2010); Skilling v United States, 561 US 
358, 403, 410 (2010); Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 405–
08 (2010) (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part); Holder v Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 US 1, 56 (2010) (Breyer dissenting); Felkner v Jackson, 562 US 594, 
598 (2011) (per curiam); Fernandez-Vargas v Gonzales, 548 US 30, 37 (2006); Morrison 
v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247, 255 (2010); NAMUDNO, 557 US at 203–05; 
Santos, 553 US at 514; Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 806 (2008) (Roberts dissenting); 
Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 US at 50; Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City 
of New York, 551 US 193, 202–03 (2007) (Stevens dissenting); eBay Inc v MercExchange, 
LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006); id at 395 (Roberts concurring); Carhart, 550 US at 153–54. 
The substantive canons used in each of these cases are listed in the Appendix. 
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it seems that not only are substantive canons infrequently in-
voked, but even when invoked, they are used only to reinforce 
other considerations in the vast majority of cases.127 
Finally, the data show that the modern Court is not invoking 
substantive canons at dramatically higher rates than legislative 
history, as some scholars have speculated. On the contrary, eight 
of the eleven justices who served on the Roberts Court during 
the period studied—including conservative, textualist-leaning 
Alito and Justice Anthony Kennedy—invoked legislative history 
more frequently than they invoked substantive canons, and 
Scalia invoked these two interpretive resources at almost equal 
rates.128 
Moreover, if we compare my data to Brudney and 
Ditslear’s data from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, we see 
that although legislative history use declined significantly from 
the Burger Court (46.6 percent) to the Rehnquist (27.7 percent) 
and Roberts (25.0 percent) Courts—as the conventional account 
holds—legislative history use has not been replaced by substan-
tive canon use.129 Substantive canon use is slightly higher on the 
Roberts Court (14.4 percent) than on the Burger Court (8.3 per-
cent)—but has declined slightly since the Rehnquist Court (15.6 
percent).130 Further, legislative history use on the Roberts Court 
(25.0 percent) remains substantially higher, overall, than does 
substantive canon use (14.4 percent).131 
Overall, these data call into question scholarly assump-
tions that, as the Court has grown more conservative in recent 
years, it has moved toward frequent reliance on substantive 
canons at the expense of legislative history.132 Indeed, I found 
only 4 conservative-outcome divided-vote cases (out of 158 divided-
vote cases and 60 closely divided cases in the data set) in which 
the majority opinion invoked a substantive canon but not legis-
lative history, while the dissenting opinion referenced legislative 
history.133 Recall that Brudney and Ditslear found 9 cases fitting 
 
 127 See Table 3. 
 128 See Table 1. In the eighty-two opinions Scalia authored, he employed substantive 
canons nine times and legislative history eight times. 
 129 Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26). 
 130 Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26). 
 131 See Table 2. 
 132 See text accompanying notes 60–63. 
 133 See generally Arlington Central, 548 US 291 (5–1–3); Rapanos v United States, 
547 US 715 (2006) (4–1–4); Chamber of Commerce, 563 US 582 (5–3); Sossamon v Texas, 
563 US 277 (2011) (6–2). 
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this pattern, out of 148 closely divided cases total.134 Brudney 
and Ditslear interpreted this subset of cases to represent a dis-
turbing snapshot of how the Court uses substantive canons to 
effect judicially desired policies at the expense of clearly ex-
pressed legislative preferences.135 I view the (smaller) subset of 
similar cases in my data set differently—that is, as evidence 
that substantive canons rarely are employed instead of, or to 
contradict, legislative history. In other words, while it may be 
true that the Court’s use of legislative history has declined since 
the Burger Court era,136 its reliance on legislative history as an 
interpretive resource has not been replaced, in most cases, with 
reliance on substantive canons. 
2. A handful of canons. 
As discussed earlier, Professors Eskridge and Frickey’s prior 
study of substantive canon use by the Burger and early 
Rehnquist Courts posited that we should expect to see wide dif-
ferences in the specific substantive canons employed by different 
Courts, or even different iterations of the same Court—and that 
the cases they studied revealed such differences.137 Eskridge also 
suggested that the universe of substantive canons is vast and 
evolving, noting that, in the period from 1987 to 1994, the Court 
invoked “no fewer than seventy-nine” different substantive can-
ons, many of them new or substantially modified canons.138 Other 
scholars have argued that there are “too many” of certain types 
of substantive canons, and that the variety of such canons 
makes it “difficult . . . to predict the courts’ interpretive path.”139 
But the data from the Roberts Court’s first six and a half 
terms call into doubt this conventional account. Out of 296 stat-
utory cases, and 87 opinions that invoked a substantive canon, I 
found only 4 instances in which the justices arguably could be 
 
 134 See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 53, 68, 78–79 (cited in note 26). 
 135 See id at 79. 
 136 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 
Wash U L Q 351, 355–57 (1994) (describing the decline in the Supreme Court’s use of 
legislative history between 1981 and 1992); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s De-
clining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 Harv 
J Legis 369, 384–87 (1999) (reporting a decline in the Court’s citations of legislative his-
tory during the period from 1980 to 1998). 
 137 Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 596 (cited in note 7). 
 138 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2). 
 139 See, for example, Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 945–46 (cited in note 25). 
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said to have created a “new” substantive canon or to have modi-
fied an existing one.140 Nor was there significant variety in the 
canons the justices invoked; most opinions referenced one of just 
six well-established canons—the avoidance canon (sixteen), the 
rule of lenity (eleven), the presumption against preemption 
(eight), a federalism clear statement rule (six), the presumption 
against retroactivity (five), or the narrow construction of waivers 
of sovereign immunity (four).141 Overall, forty-eight of the eighty-
seven (55.2 percent) Roberts Court opinions that invoked a sub-
stantive canon employed one of just a handful of canons.142 The 
remaining opinions referenced thirty-three other canons—
meaning that in the period between 2006 and 2012, the Court 
employed only thirty-nine different substantive canons, total.143 
Even if we disaggregate the federalism clear statement rules and 
count each one separately, the total number would come to only 
forty-four different canons.144 This is a far cry from the seventy-
nine substantive canons that Eskridge and Frickey recorded 
during the Court’s 1987 through 1994 terms.145 
There could be many reasons for these stark differences in 
the variety of canons invoked over different time periods. No-
tably, the Court’s docket has shrunk over the years, so the 
number of statutory cases decided likely was larger during the 
period of Eskridge and Frickey’s study.146 In addition, the 
 
 140 These cases are Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 602 (2006) (Stevens) (plurality) 
(establishing a new rule requiring a clear statement before the common law of war can 
make offenses not defined by statute triable by military commission); Gonzalez, 132 S Ct 
at 648–49 (Sotomayor) (articulating the canon that “[a] rule is jurisdictional ‘if the Legis-
lature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as juris-
dictional,’” and citing only a previous Roberts Court case, Arbaugh v Y & H Corp, 546 
US 500 (2006), for support) (brackets omitted); NAMUDNO, 557 US at 203 (Roberts) 
(holding that the equal state sovereignty principle requires a showing that any “dispa-
rate geographic coverage” in a statute “is sufficiently related to the problem that [the 
statute] targets”); and Stanford, 563 US at 795 (Breyer dissenting) (articulating “a back-
ground norm that . . . denies [ ] inventors patent rights growing out of research for which 
the public has already paid”). Notably, three of these four “new canon” inventions came 
from intentionalist, rather than textualist, justices. 
 141 See Appendix. 
 142 These numbers reflect one overlap; the majority opinion in Skilling invoked both 
the avoidance canon and the rule of lenity. See Skilling, 561 US at 403, 410. 
 143 See Appendix. Two avoidance canon opinions also invoked other canons; these 
were included in the thirty-three-figure total. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2), citing 
Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 101–08 (cited in note 75). 
 146 The Roberts Court has heard roughly eighty cases per term since 2006. See Stat 
Pack Archive (cited in note 86). By contrast, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts heard 
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Court’s composition stayed conservative over the entire period 
from 1994 to 2012, so the Roberts Court may have been closer, 
ideologically, to the Rehnquist Court than the Rehnquist Court 
was to the Burger Court. As a result, the Roberts Court may 
have found less need to create new canons or to reinvent canons 
created by the Rehnquist Court in order to reach its preferred 
results. Alternately, perhaps the Roberts Court is inherently 
more cautious than was the Rehnquist Court.147 
Another possibility is that Eskridge and Frickey may have 
defined what constitutes a substantive canon more broadly than 
I did. At a theoretical level, there does not seem to be much dif-
ference between Eskridge and Frickey’s conception of what con-
stitutes a substantive canon and mine—we agree that such can-
ons establish rules or presumptions of statutory construction 
that are based on substantive policy norms derived from the 
Constitution, common law, or general Anglo-American legal tra-
ditions.148 In practice, however, they may have been more capa-
cious in what they counted as a substantive canon. One crude 
way to test this possibility is to compare the list of substantive 
 
roughly 150 cases per term. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: 
Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093, 1100 (1987); Thomas E. Baker and Douglas D. 
McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 Harv L Rev 1400, 1400–01 (1987). 
 147 During his confirmation hearings, Roberts famously likened the role of a Supreme 
Court justice to that of a baseball umpire, whose job is “to call balls and strikes, and not 
to pitch or bat.” Chief Justice Roberts Statement - Nomination Process (Administrative 
Office of the US Courts), archived at http://perma.cc/FZH3-7AVK. He is rumored, more-
over, to have voted with the liberal members of the Court to uphold the Affordable Care 
Act in NFIB in order to preserve the institutional legitimacy of the Court. See, for exam-
ple, Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 Tenn L Rev 763, 769 
(2013) (arguing that Roberts’s “driving concern” in NFIB “was credibility—the institu-
tional legitimacy of the Court, and his own reputation and legacy”); David L. Franklin, 
Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court. (Slate, June 28, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/76LR-CNQ6 (suggesting that “the court’s very legitimacy” was at stake 
and that Roberts ruled the way he did “to save the court”). Thus, his jurisprudential phi-
losophy may be one that lends itself more to the use of existing interpretive resources 
than to the creation of new canons. 
 148 Compare Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 595 (cited in note 7) (describ-
ing substantive canons as “the clear statement rules or presumptions of statutory inter-
pretation that reflect substantive values drawn from the common law, federal statutes, 
or the United States Constitution”) (citation omitted), with Krishnakumar, 62 Hastings 
L J at 240 (cited in note 87) (defining substantive canons as “interpretive presumptions 
and rules based on background legal norms, policies, and conventions,” and noting that 
“[t]hey derive primarily from the common law, the Constitution, and legal tradition”). 
See also Eskridge E-mail (cited in note 114) (explaining that the Eskridge and Frickey 
study defined substantive canons as “explicitly substantive norm based default rule[s]”). 
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canons provided in the appendix to Eskridge and Frickey’s stat-
utory interpretation casebook with the list of substantive canons 
identified in this study.149 Such a comparison reveals that 
Eskridge and Frickey identified eight substantive canons from 
the 2005–2011 terms that my study did not count as substantive 
canons.150 This crude comparison suggests that Eskridge and 
Frickey were, indeed, somewhat more generous in their deter-
minations of what counts as a substantive canon. But it is un-
certain whether such definitional or coding differences account 
for the entire gap between Eskridge and Frickey’s findings of ex-
tensive substantive canon use and my more modest findings. In-
deed, even if we add these eight canons to the list compiled in 
my Appendix, the total number of different canons invoked dur-
ing the 2005 through 2011 terms would come to fifty-two—still a 
long way from the seventy-nine different canons identified by 
Eskridge in his earlier study.151 
Ultimately, it is unclear which of the two studies captures 
the norm regarding the Court’s use of substantive canons across 
time, or if either one does—it is possible that both studies are 
anomalies or sui generis. Either way, the differences in the vari-
ety of substantive canons invoked by the Roberts versus 
Rehnquist and Burger Courts—and especially the Roberts 
Court’s lack of new substantive canon creation—are intriguing. 
Moreover, whatever the reason for the differences between the 
two periods studied, it is undeniable that the Roberts Court has 
been surprisingly predictable, as well as somewhat restrained, 
 
 149 Compare Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 
1203–15 (cited in note 1), with Appendix. 
 150 The cases these canons were employed in are National Meat Association v Harris, 
132 S Ct 965 (2012) (holding that the presumption against preemption does not apply if 
clear language or purpose allows preemption); Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 
(2006) (construing the Vienna Convention, not a statute); Wallace v Kato, 549 US 384 
(2007) (implying that Congress borrows state statutes of limitations for federal statutory 
schemes; coded in my study as a rule about when other statutes should be invoked); 
Safeco Insurance Co of America v Burr, 551 US 47 (2007) (holding that the willfulness 
requirement in civil sanction cases typically includes reckless conduct; coded in my study 
as invoking the common law and Supreme Court precedent); Samantar v Yousuf, 560 US 
305 (2010) (assuming that Congress considers the legitimate sovereign interests of other 
nations when writing American laws); Richlin Security Service Co v Chertoff, 553 US 571 
(2008) (refusing to apply a presumption against waivers of US sovereign immunity); 
Hardy v Cross, 132 S Ct 490 (2011) (per curiam) (“[I]f the state-court decision was rea-
sonable, it cannot be disturbed.”); Rehberg v Paulk, 132 S Ct 1497 (2012) (indicating 
that, in evaluating official immunity, courts look to the immunities that officials histori-
cally received at common law; coded in my study as reliance on common law). 
 151 See text accompanying notes 137–38. 
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with respect to the universe of substantive canons it has in-
voked: again, just six well-established canons account for more 
than half of the Court’s total substantive canon references.152 
These data contradict the conventional view that there are “too 
many” substantive canons and that their ubiquity makes it diffi-
cult to predict the courts’ interpretive path.153 
3. Ideology. 
As noted in Part I, many commentators have argued that 
judges use substantive canons strategically, to achieve outcomes 
that accord with their policy preferences. Brudney and Ditslear’s 
study of workplace law cases reinforced this view, finding that 
liberal justices tend to use canons (both language and substan-
tive) to reach liberal outcomes, while conservative justices use 
canons to reach conservative outcomes.154 The data from the 
Roberts Court’s first six and a half terms are only partly con-
sistent with these findings. Table 4 reports the ideological direc-
tion for each justice for every opinion he or she authored or 
joined that referenced a substantive canon.155 As Table 4 shows, 
all of the liberal justices employed substantive canons to support 
liberal outcomes at far higher rates than they employed such can-
ons to support conservative outcomes.156 However, four of the five 
conservative justices—Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Kennedy—
employed substantive canons to reach liberal results in almost 
the same number of cases as they used substantive canons to 
reach conservative results.157 
 
 
 152 See text accompanying notes 141–42. 
 153 See, for example, Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 945–46 (cited in note 25) 
(suggesting that there are “too many” clear statement rules). 
 154 See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 57–60 (cited in note 26). 
 155 See Table 4. Dissenting opinions are coded for their ideology, just as majority 
opinions are. So, for example, if a majority opinion reaches a liberal outcome, the dis-
senting opinion will be coded as reaching a conservative outcome, and any substan-
tive canons used in the dissenting opinion will be coded as supporting a conservative 
outcome. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. 
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TABLE 4.  IDEOLOGY BY JUSTICE IN OPINIONS AUTHORED OR 
JOINED INVOKING SUBSTANTIVE CANONS 
(N=87) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology % Conservative % Liberal % Neither  
Cons–Lib 
Difference 
Thomas 
(n=46) Conservative 50.0% (23) 47.8% (22) 2.2% (1) 2.2% 
Scalia 
(n=50) Conservative 50.0% (25) 46.0% (23) 4.0% (2) 4.0% 
Alito 
(n=41) Conservative 63.4% (26) 34.1% (14) 2.4% (1) 29.3% 
Roberts 
(n=44) Conservative 43.2% (19) 54.5% (24) 2.3% (1) –11.3% 
Kennedy 
(n=51) Conservative 45.1% (23) 52.9% (27) 2.0% (1) –7.8% 
Breyer 
(n=45) Liberal 28.9% (13) 66.7% (30) 4.4% (2) –37.8% 
Kagan 
(n=14) Liberal 35.7% (5) 64.3% (9) 0.0% (0) –28.6% 
Souter 
(n=28) Liberal 32.1% (9) 64.3% (18) 3.6% (1) –32.2% 
Ginsburg 
(n=53) Liberal 30.2% (16) 66.0% (35) 3.8% (2) –35.8% 
Sotomayor 
(n=23) Liberal 26.1% (6) 73.9% (17) 0.0% (0) –47.8% 
Stevens 
(n=41) Liberal 26.8% (11) 68.3% (28) 4.9% (2) –41.5% 
n = the number of cases in which the justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced a 
substantive canon. For example, cases in which a majority opinion invoked a substantive canon, but 
in which the justice authored or joined a dissenting opinion that did not invoke a substantive canon, 
are not counted in the denominator. 
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Table 5 similarly reports the ideological direction of the 
opinions authored by each justice that invoked a substantive 
canon. 
TABLE 5.  IDEOLOGY BY JUSTICE IN AUTHORED OPINIONS 
INVOKING SUBSTANTIVE CANONS 
(N=87) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology % Conservative % Liberal % Neither* 
Cons–Lib 
Difference 
Thomas 
(n=9) Conservative 44.4% (4) 55.6% (5) 0.0% (0) –11.2% 
Scalia 
(n=9) Conservative 44.4% (4) 55.6% (5) 0.0% (0) –11.2% 
Alito 
(n=8) Conservative 37.5% (3) 50.0% (4) 12.5% (1) –12.5% 
Roberts 
(n=9) Conservative 33.3% (3) 66.7% (6) 0.0% (0) –33.4% 
Kennedy 
(n=7) Conservative 71.4% (5) 28.6% (2) 0.0% (0) 42.8% 
Breyer 
(n=9) Liberal 0.0% (0) 100.0% (9) 0.0% (0) –100.0% 
Kagan 
(n=1) Liberal 100.0% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 100.0% 
Souter 
(n=5) Liberal 60.0% (3) 40.0% (2) 0.0% (0) 20.0% 
Ginsburg 
(n=9) Liberal 11.1% (1) 88.9% (8) 0.0% (0) –77.8% 
Sotomayor 
(n=6) Liberal 66.7% (4) 33.3% (2) 0.0% (0) 33.4% 
Stevens 
(n=15) Liberal 40.0% (6) 53.3% (8) 6.7% (1) –13.3% 
 
   
 
 * The Conservative and Liberal columns do not reflect opinions authored by justices 
that were coded as “unspecified” in ideological direction using the Spaeth Supreme Court 
Database’s coding designation. 
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Caution should be used in interpreting the precise percent-
ages reported, because the raw number of cases is quite low for 
each justice. However, the pattern demonstrated is clear. The 
Table shows that four of the justices employed substantive canons 
to reach outcomes consistent with their ideological preferences in 
the majority of opinions they authored.158 Four justices—Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito, and Justice David Souter—wrote opinions that 
used substantive canons to support liberal and conservative out-
comes at equal or nearly equal rates.159 Roberts and Sotomayor 
were the only justices who employed substantive canons in-
consistently with their ideological preferences in a substantial 
majority of the cases in which they authored an opinion that 
used substantive canons.160 The next Section discusses Roberts’s 
use of substantive canons in greater detail, arguing that he often 
invoked such canons because of institutional concerns, including 
a desire to avoid upsetting congressional intent. 
   
 
 158 See Table 5. 
 159 See id (reporting a one-case differential between liberal and conservative out-
comes for Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Souter). 
 160 See id (reporting that Roberts used substantive canons to reach liberal outcomes 
in 66.7 percent of the opinions he authored that invoked substantive canons, and to 
reach conservative outcomes in only 33.3 percent of these opinions, and that Sotomayor 
similarly used substantive canons to reach conservative outcomes in 66.7 percent of the 
opinions she authored that invoked substantive canons, and to reach liberal outcomes in 
only 33.3 percent of these opinions). Justice Elena Kagan was not included in this count 
because she authored only one opinion in the data set that invoked a substantive canon. 
See id. 
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TABLE 5A.  SUBSTANTIVE CANONS INVOKED BY CONSERVATIVE 
JUSTICES IN OPINIONS WITH LIBERAL OUTCOMES 
Substantive Canon 
Thomas 
(n=5) 
Scalia 
(n=7) 
Alito 
(n=4) 
Roberts 
(n=8) 
Kennedy 
(n=2) 
Avoidance canon (1)   (2) (1) 
Rule of lenity  (4)* (1) (1) 
Federalism clear statement rule  (1)*   
Burden on the taxpayer seeking a 
deduction    (1)  
Non obstante (allowing implied 
repeal) (1)      
APA presumption of judicial review 
of all final agency actions  (1) 
    
Presumption against retroactivity  (1)   
Narrow construction against the 
government   (1)  
 
Presumption against a major 
departure from the “long tradition” 
of equity practice 
(1)   (1)  
Clear statement rule for attorney’s 
fee awards (1)   
   
Ambiguity resolved in favor of 
veterans   (1)   
Clear statement rule for 
disallowing state law claims   (1)  
 
Presumption that the Bankruptcy 
Code does not erode past practice 
absent clear intent 
  (1)   
Presumption favoring the retention 
of “long-established and familiar 
principles” 
   (1)  
Equal sovereignty principle    (1)  
Presumption favoring severability    (1)  
Presumption that waivers of 
sovereign immunity must be clearly 
stated 
(1)     
 
As Table 5a shows, there was no clear pattern in the specific 
substantive canons that the conservative justices invoked in 
 
  In one case, Roberts authored a majority opinion that referenced both the avoid-
ance canon and an equal sovereignty principle. See generally NAMUDNO, 557 US 193. 
In another, he authored a majority opinion that referenced both the avoidance canon and 
a presumption favoring severability. See generally NFIB, 132 S Ct 2566. 
 * In one case, Scalia authored a concurring opinion that referenced both the rule of 
lenity and a federalism clear statement rule. See Fowler, 563 US at 682–85 (Scalia con-
curring in the judgment). 
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support of liberal outcomes. While Scalia did invoke the rule of 
lenity often—in four of nine opinions he authored (representing 
four of ten substantive canons referenced in those opinions)—
both he and the other conservative justices invoked an array of 
other substantive canons as well when authoring opinions that 
reached liberal results. 
The data regarding the justices’ ideological use of substan-
tive canons—or, perhaps more accurately, demonstrating that 
substantive canons do not seem to be constraining the justices to 
vote against their ideological preferences in most cases—are not 
surprising. Several earlier studies have found that the members 
of the Court tend to vote consistently with their ideological pref-
erences in statutory cases.161 But the data showing that Roberts 
and Scalia used substantive canons to support liberal outcomes 
more often than conservative outcomes in the opinions they au-
thored, and that several of the other conservative justices, in-
cluding Thomas, authored or joined opinions that invoked sub-
stantive canons to reach liberal outcomes in as many (or nearly 
as many) cases as they did to reach conservative outcomes, are 
unexpected and noteworthy. This is especially so in light of the 
widespread scholarly assumption, detailed in Part I, that judges—
particularly textualist judges—use substantive canons manipu-
latively, to subvert legislative intent and to justify outcomes 
that accord with their policy preferences. 
C. Doctrinal Analysis: Attentiveness to Congressional Intent 
As discussed in Part I.A, the conventional consensus among 
legal scholars has been that judges employ substantive canons 
in a manner that usurps or frustrates legislative policy prefer-
ences. But doctrinal analysis of the Roberts Court’s substantive 
canon cases—and particularly of the opinions that rely primarily 
on a substantive canon—reveals a substantial number of cases 
in which the justices used substantive canons to preserve con-
gressional intent.162 This Section describes how the Roberts 
 
 161 See, for example, Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at 
176 (cited in note 89); Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 57–60 (cited in note 26). 
 162 “Congressional intent” is a notoriously amorphous term—one that eludes simple 
definition and has generated much controversy in the statutory interpretation literature. 
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, 
fictive for a collective body.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv L Rev 863, 
870 (1930) (“A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words 
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Court, many times in opinions authored by Roberts, has used sub-
stantive canons to honor congressional overrides of prior Supreme 
Court decisions, to preserve long-standing statutes from judicial 
invalidation, and to approximate congressional intent. 
The cases are remarkable not just because they challenge 
the conventional account that substantive canons tend to be 
used to trump legislative intent, but also because several invoke 
substantive canons that are by nature designed to check Congress, 
or even to defeat congressional intent in the name of some larger—
typically constitutional—concern. The avoidance canon, for ex-
ample, deliberately seeks to curtail the reach of federal statutes 
in order to cure potential constitutional defects—even when 
Congress may have intended a much broader reach and wished 
to push the envelope as far as possible regarding what is consti-
tutionally permissible. Similarly, federalism clear statement 
rules, such as the presumption against preemption, are designed 
to cut back the scope of congressional legislation in order to pre-
serve state laws and power. Yet as the cases discussed in this 
Section demonstrate, the Roberts Court has used both of these 
canons to fulfill likely congressional intent, despite their intent-
negating design. By contrast, other substantive canons seem de-
signed to effectuate Congress’s larger policy goals regarding par-
ticular subject areas—for example, the maxim that preferences 
in the Bankruptcy Code are to be narrowly construed in order to 
fulfill the Code’s equal distribution goal—and the Roberts Court 
 
which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in re-
gard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably 
did have, different ideas and beliefs.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an 
“It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals 
have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not. To pretend 
otherwise is fanciful.”); William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 16–21 
(Harvard 1994) (arguing that actual congressional intent is almost always unknowable 
and that conventional intent is equally unhelpful because of strategic behavior such as 
vote counting). In this Section, which highlights judicial efforts to honor congressional 
intent, I use the term to refer to any expression of legislative design that the Court takes 
to represent the enacting Congress’s intent—including the enacting Congress’s ex-
pressed goal of overriding a previous judicial interpretation, inferences drawn from legis-
lative history, and the presumption that the enacting Congress would have wanted the 
statute it enacted to be upheld rather than invalidated. For purposes of this Section, 
what matters is not whether the Court got Congress’s intent right but, rather, whether 
the Court endeavored to discern or made an effort to determine what that intent was 
and to construe the statute in a manner that would effectuate, rather than undermine, 
what it perceived to be Congress’s intent. 
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has invoked such canons in a manner that furthers congressional 
intent as well. 
In providing these case examples, I do not mean to suggest 
that cases do not exist in which the members of the Roberts 
Court invoked substantive canons without paying attention to 
congressional intent, or even used substantive canons to defeat 
congressional intent. Rather, my aim is to bring to light the fact 
that substantive canon use is not necessarily inconsistent with 
attentiveness to congressional intent, and that substantive can-
ons were not used to defeat congressional intent in most cases in 
which they were invoked. Indeed, my doctrinal analysis of the 
cases in this study revealed only fifteen opinions (out of eighty-
seven total) in which the members of the Roberts Court invoked 
substantive canons in a manner that arguably served to defeat 
Congress’s intent.163 
 
 163 See generally Arlington Central, 548 US 291 (federalism clear statement) (hold-
ing that the IDEA does not authorize the recovery of expert fees by prevailing parties 
against states); Rapanos, 547 US 715 (federalism clear statement and avoidance) (limiting 
the Clean Water Act’s reach to relatively stable bodies of water); Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 
US 33 (federalism clear statement) (limiting the stamp tax exemption in the Bankruptcy 
Code to plans already confirmed under Chapter 11); Altria, 555 US 70 (presumption 
against preemption) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act does 
not preempt a party’s state law fraud claim); Chamber of Commerce, 563 US 582 (pre-
sumption against preemption) (holding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act did 
not preempt Arizona’s sanctions on employing unauthorized aliens via a licensing pro-
gram despite an explicit preemption clause); Santos, 553 US 507 (rule of lenity) (limiting 
a federal money laundering statute to apply to criminal profits but not receipts); United 
States v Hayes, 555 US 415 (2009) (Roberts dissenting) (rule of lenity) (arguing that a 
domestic relationship is a defining element of domestic violence under the Gun Control 
Act of 1968); Rodriquez, 553 US 377 (Souter dissenting) (rule of lenity) (arguing that a 
state’s maximum prison term should not be applied to a federal conviction for possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon); Sossamon, 563 US 277 (narrow construction for waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity) (holding that states do not waive sovereign immunity from 
private suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 when they accept federal funding, despite the Act’s express provision 
of a private cause of action against a government); Microsoft, 550 US 437 (presumption 
against extraterritorial application of domestic laws) (holding that Microsoft was not lia-
ble under the Patent Act for foreign installations of Windows that had the potential to 
infringe AT&T’s patent); Hamdan, 548 US 557 (common law of war must clearly author-
ize trial by military commission) (holding that the military commission convened to try a 
Yemeni national was not authorized and lacked the power to proceed); CBOCS, 553 US 
442 (Thomas dissenting) (affirmative evidence of congressional intent necessary for an 
implied remedy) (arguing that 42 USC § 1981 does not encompass retaliation claims); 
AT&T Corp v Hulteen, 556 US 701 (2009) (presumption against retroactivity) (holding 
that an employer does not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by applying a rule 
that gives less retirement credit for pregnancy than for other medical leave when the rule 
is applied only to the period before the Act’s passage); Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
LLC v Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 US 148 (2008) (no expansion of private rights beyond 
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1. Honoring overrides. 
The canon of constitutional avoidance has long been criti-
cized as sanctioning the judicial revision of statutes in a manner 
that undercuts Congress’s design.164 The canon operates on the 
assumption that Congress would not want to press constitutional 
limits and would rather have its laws upheld in some form than 
invalidated as unconstitutional.165 But as several scholars have 
pointed out, it might make more sense to presume that Congress 
prefers to legislate to the maximum extent of its power and to 
have its work product given full effect—and for the Court to 
openly say so when it believes that work product to be unconsti-
tutional, rather than use the possibility of a constitutional viola-
tion as an excuse to rewrite the statute.166 
Given these prevailing assumptions, it was surprising to 
find a number of Roberts Court cases in which the justices 
seemed to be using the avoidance canon to honor congressional 
intent—not just paying lip service to what Congress presum-
ably wanted, but engaging in a serious effort to give effect to 
Congress’s overall aim in amending or enacting a statute. The 
cases took two forms. First, a number of cases involved opinions 
that invoked the avoidance canon to support a construction that 
honored a recent congressional override. Second, a handful of 
cases involved opinions that used the canon to preserve a long-
standing statute from what the opinions explicitly found would 
 
congressional intent) (holding that a private right of action under the Securities Exchange 
Act did not reach the respondents); Gonzalez, 132 S Ct 641 (clear statement rule for stat-
utory limits on jurisdiction) (holding, among other things, that 28 USC § 2253(c)(3) does 
not set forth a jurisdictional rule). 
 164 See, for example, Schauer, 1995 S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 9) (“[I]n interpret-
ing statutes so as to avoid ‘unnecessary’ constitutional decisions, the Court frequently 
interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional ques-
tions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred.”) (citation omitted); Frickey, 
93 Cal L Rev at 444 (cited in note 32) (“Many of the Court’s opinions used the avoidance 
canon to confine statutes to domains narrower than their enacting Congresses probably 
intended.”). 
 165 See Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 726 
(cited in note 1); Hasen, 2009 S Ct Rev at 186 (cited in note 46). 
 166 See Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 726 
(cited in note 1); Schauer, 1995 S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 9); Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, 
and Governance at 105 (cited in note 9) (arguing that a “truly restrained court . . . would 
do better to confront the constitutional question head on” because “even if [the court] in-
validates the law, it at least returns the legislature to the status quo ante and gives the 
legislature a more realistic chance of concocting a constitutional policy that is close to its 
most-preferred position”); Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 43–45 (cited in note 9). 
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be otherwise-certain constitutional invalidity—rather than to 
rewrite the statute based on speculated or possible invalidity, as 
the conventional critique predicts. 
The first set of cases tended to follow this pattern: an earlier 
Supreme Court case invalidated a statute or limited its reach on 
constitutional grounds, Congress sought to override the decision 
by amending the statute to “fix” the constitutional problem, and 
then a new lawsuit arose in which the Court was required to in-
terpret the amended statute—and to determine whether the 
amended statute contained the same deficiencies as the original 
version. In reviewing the congressional override, the Roberts 
Court invoked the avoidance canon and argued that the Court 
should read the amended statute in a way that recognized 
Congress’s clear intent to remedy the problems that led to inval-
idation of the original statute, rather than construe the new 
statute to repeat the deficiencies contained in the original. 
A couple of examples should help illustrate. First, in Skilling 
v United States,167 the Court considered whether a recently en-
acted criminal statute covered honest-services fraud, including 
investment fraud.168 Like other cases involving overrides, Skilling 
had a backstory. For decades, the federal courts of appeals had 
construed the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to cover acts 
that deprive the public of the “intangible” right to receive “hon-
est services,” such as bribery and kickback schemes.169 In 
McNally v United States,170 the Supreme Court put a stop to this 
construction, holding that the mail fraud statute does not cover 
honest-services fraud.171 Congress responded quickly, enacting a 
new statute that was designed “specifically to cover” the “intan-
gible right of honest services” that lower courts had protected 
prior to McNally.172 
Jeffrey Skilling was an Enron executive charged with in-
vestment fraud under the new statute; he challenged the new 
 
 167 561 US 358 (2010). 
 168 Id at 367–68. 
 169 Id at 399–401. 
 170 483 US 350 (1987). 
 171 See id at 360. The Court cited vagueness and federalism concerns, explaining 
that “[r]ather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries 
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and 
good government for local and state officials,” it would read the statute “as limited in 
scope to the protection of property rights.” Id. 
 172 Skilling, 561 US at 402. See also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7603, Pub L No 
100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4508. 
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law as unconstitutionally vague.173 The Roberts Court acknowl-
edged that “Skilling’s vagueness challenge has force,” but in-
voked the avoidance canon, noting that “[i]t has long been our 
practice, [ ] before striking a federal statute as impermissibly 
vague, to consider whether the prescription is amenable to a 
limiting construction.”174 The Court observed that the history of 
Court-Congress interactions demonstrated that Congress intend-
ed for the new statute “to refer to and incorporate the honest-
services doctrine recognized in Court of Appeals’ decisions before 
McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of fraud.”175 It 
then found that while the pre-McNally case law was incon-
sistent about the outer reaches of the honest-services doctrine, 
the “vast majority” of honest-services cases decided before 
McNally involved offenders who participated in bribery or kick-
back schemes, in violation of a fiduciary duty.176 In order to “pre-
serve the statute without transgressing constitutional limita-
tions,” the Court thus read the new law to criminalize “only the 
bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law” and not to 
apply to investment frauds such as that committed by Skilling.177 
Although the majority opinion in Skilling limited the reach 
of the new honest-services statute, it did so in a manner that 
very consciously sought to preserve coverage of the primary con-
duct associated with the doctrine—and the only conduct indis-
putably intended to be covered by Congress. Indeed, because 
pre-McNally case law was unclear about what behavior beyond 
bribes and kickbacks counted as honest-services fraud, it is un-
certain whether the behavior left out by the Court’s construction 
fell within Congress’s consideration and whether legislators had 
any specific intent to include or not include it within the new 
statute’s reach. 
Further, in applying the avoidance canon to limit the stat-
ute’s coverage, the Court made clear that the alternative was 
near-certain constitutional invalidation on vagueness grounds.178 
In other words, the limiting construction was the only way to 
give effect to Congress’s clearly expressed intent to override 
McNally. Thus, the Court was not using a merely possible or 
 
 173 Skilling, 561 US at 402–03. 
 174 Id at 405. 
 175 Id at 404. 
 176 Id at 405, 407. 
 177 Skilling, 561 US at 408–09. 
 178 See id at 405. 
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speculative constitutional concern as an excuse to rewrite the 
statute, as some scholars have argued that the avoidance canon 
encourages it to do.179 In short, although the Skilling majority 
employed the avoidance canon in a manner that cut back the 
scope of the honest-services statute, it seemed highly attuned to 
congressional intent in so doing. For this reason, the case does 
not seem to fit within the conventional account of the relation-
ship between the avoidance canon and congressional intent. 
A second example of this form of substantive canon atten-
tiveness to congressional intent occurred in Gonzales v Carhart,180 
in which the Court considered the validity of the federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.181 That statute was enacted fol-
lowing the Court’s decision in Stenberg v Carhart,182 which held 
that a Nebraska “partial-birth abortion” statute violated the 
federal Constitution because its ban applied too broadly—
covering the commonly used dilation and evacuation procedure 
(“D&E”) as well as the dilation and extraction procedure known 
as “partial-birth” abortion (“D&X”).183 In enacting the statute, 
Congress was responding directly to the Stenberg ruling and 
sought to avoid the Nebraska statute’s constitutional difficulties 
by being more precise about the procedures to which it applied.184 
The federal Act was very explicit about Congress’s intent to rem-
edy the deficiencies the Court had found in the Nebraska statute; 
in fact, its opening provisions expressly referenced the Court’s 
opinion in Stenberg.185 Several doctors and the pro-choice orga-
nization Planned Parenthood challenged the new federal Act, 
 
 179 See, for example, Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 444, 447 (cited in note 32): 
[T]he avoidance canon is one handy tool, a sort of Swiss army knife for trim-
ming excesses from public law and readjusting what remains thereafter. . . . 
 . . . In effect, the canon creates a penumbra around the Constitution that 
dooms statutes raising serious constitutional questions to creative judicial re-
writing, even though, if push came to shove, courts would presumably uphold 
the constitutionality of at least some of these laws. 
See also Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 45 (cited in note 9) (suggesting that the 
canon allows judicial rewriting of statutes); Posner, The Federal Courts at 285 (cited in 
note 9) (same). 
 180 550 US 124 (2007). 
 181 Pub L No 108-105, 117 Stat 1201, codified at 18 USC § 1531. 
 182 530 US 914 (2000). 
 183 Id at 921–22, 939, 945–46. 
 184 Carhart, 550 US at 132–33, 141–43. 
 185 Id at 132–33. 
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arguing that despite Congress’s attempts at precision, it too was 
unconstitutionally vague.186 
Before addressing the Act’s constitutionality, the Court 
sought to determine the scope of the Act’s operation and effect. 
The Act’s challengers claimed that it was void for vagueness be-
cause, like the Nebraska statute, it was unclear about whether 
it reached D&E procedures other than the “partial-birth” proce-
dure.187 The Court disagreed, construing the Act to cover only 
the “partial-birth” procedure and not to prohibit other D&E pro-
cedures.188 In so doing, the Court highlighted numerous places in 
which the Act deliberately differed from the Nebraska statute, 
observing that Congress sought “to meet the [ ] objections” the 
Court articulated in Stenberg and that “[t]he Act makes the dis-
tinction the Nebraska statute failed to draw.”189 The Court then 
referenced the canon of constitutional avoidance, noting that the 
canon “extinguishes any lingering doubt as to whether the Act 
covers the prototypical D&E procedure” because it requires that 
“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to 
save a statute from unconstitutionality.”190 
Far from using the avoidance canon to justify rewriting or 
limiting the federal Act in a manner that inhibited the full im-
plementation of Congress’s intent, the Court in Carhart seemed 
to pay significant attention to what Congress was trying to 
achieve through its statutory override. The Court repeatedly 
compared the federal statute to the Nebraska statute invalidated 
in Stenberg and focused on the ways in which Congress had 
sought to address the problems the Stenberg Court had found 
with the Nebraska version.191 Moreover, as in Skilling, the Court 
made clear that the alternative to its limiting construction was 
constitutional invalidation, and that use of the avoidance canon 
offered a way to avert a reading that would render Congress’s 
override ineffectual.192 
 
 186 Id at 133, 147. 
 187 See id at 147–48. 
 188 See Carhart, 550 US at 149–50. 
 189 Id at 149–53. 
 190 Id at 153–54. 
 191 See id at 151–53. 
 192 See Carhart, 550 US at 153. A third example of a judicial interpretation that 
employed the avoidance canon to honor a congressional override is Roberts’s dissenting 
opinion in Boumediene. In Boumediene, a majority of the Court struck down the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)—a legislative response to the Court’s decisions in 
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004), and Hamdan—on the grounds that the MCA 
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2. Respecting Congress’s work product. 
In two prominent cases and a dissenting opinion in a third 
case, the members of the Roberts Court also used (or advocated 
using) the avoidance canon to preserve a politically salient lib-
eral statute from invalidation. The majority opinions in the first 
two cases were written by Roberts, and constituted notable in-
stances of a conservative justice using a substantive canon to 
reach a liberal result.193 The third case contained a dissenting 
opinion penned by Stevens that invoked the avoidance canon to 
argue for the preservation of a high-stakes liberal statute.194 
Perhaps the most famous of the cases is National Federation 
of Independent Business v Sebelius195 (“NFIB”), in which a divided 
Roberts Court upheld most provisions of the Obama administra-
tion’s Affordable Care Act.196 The key provision at issue was the 
individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase a 
health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage 
or be forced to pay a penalty to the IRS when they file their in-
come taxes.197 Challengers claimed that the individual mandate 
exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.198 The Obama ad-
ministration argued that Congress had the power to mandate 
the purchase of health insurance under the Commerce Clause, 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and, as a fallback, un-
der its power to “lay and collect Taxes.”199 
A majority of the Court ruled that the health-care law ex-
ceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.200 However, a dif-
ferent majority of the Court upheld the mandate under Congress’s 
 
violated the Suspension Clause. Boumediene, 553 US at 732–36. Roberts’s dissenting 
opinion argued that the Court should have applied the avoidance canon to interpret a 
related statute, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, to allow the DC Circuit to order the 
release of unlawfully detained individuals—which would have kept the MCA from run-
ning afoul of the Suspension Clause. See id at 822–23 (Roberts dissenting). 
 193 See generally NFIB, 132 S Ct 2566; NAMUDNO, 557 US 193. 
 194 See Citizens United, 558 US at 405–08 (Stevens concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
 195 132 S Ct 2566 (2012). 
 196 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 197 See 26 USC § 5000A(b)(1). 
 198 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2580. 
 199 Id at 2584–85, 2593. 
 200 See id at 2608 (Roberts) (plurality); id at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito dissenting). 
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taxing power.201 Roberts’s opinion acknowledged that “[t]he most 
straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands in-
dividuals to purchase insurance.”202 But it went on to construe 
the mandate to merely “establish[ ] a condition—not owning 
health insurance—that triggers a tax” and to hold that, under 
this reading, the mandate was “not a legal command to buy in-
surance.”203 In so doing, the opinion relied heavily on the avoid-
ance canon. “The question,” Roberts stated, “is not whether [the 
tax reading] is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, 
but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”204 As he explained, 
“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to 
save a statute from unconstitutionality.”205 Notably, Roberts’s 
opinion laid bare the institutional stakes involved, commenting 
that “[t]he Government asks us to interpret the mandate as im-
posing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution. 
Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal 
statutes, it can be so read.”206 
These statements make clear that the Court’s interpretation 
was driven by a strong commitment to preserving the statute be-
fore it if at all possible. Indeed, Roberts openly was influenced 
by institutional comity considerations—as evidenced by his ex-
plicit references to the “deference owed to federal statutes” and 
the fact that he was reading the statute as “[t]he Government 
ask[ed].”207 Contrary to the conventional avoidance canon criti-
cism, NFIB simply does not read as a case in which the Court 
used the canon to limit the scope of a statute to which it was 
hostile, or to fulfill judicial policy preferences at the expense of 
legislative ones. Rather, it reads as a case in which the Court 
used the avoidance canon to embrace an alternate reading that 
the government—that is, the president with the presumptive 
support of the enacting Congress—asked it to embrace.208 
 
 201 See id at 2594–95 (Roberts, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan). 
 202 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2593 (Roberts) (opinion). 
 203 Id at 2594 (Roberts) (opinion). 
 204 Id (Roberts) (opinion). 
 205 Id (Roberts) (opinion). 
 206 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2594 (Roberts) (opinion) (emphases added). 
 207 Id (Roberts) (opinion). 
 208 For an additional example, see Citizens United, 558 US at 405–408 (Stevens con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the majority opinion should have 
employed the avoidance canon to narrowly read the Federal Election Commission regu-
lations at issue not to cover video-on-demand transmissions, rather than reaching out to 
decide the constitutional issue unnecessarily). 
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It is worth noting that NFIB involved an extraordinarily 
visible, high-stakes statute enacted by a recent Congress. This 
may explain why Roberts—hardly an intentionalist by philoso-
phy209—voted to uphold the statute. As the chief justice, Roberts 
may have been particularly concerned about institutional con-
siderations, including the need to respect the legislative branch, 
preserve Congress’s work product, and protect the legitimacy of 
the Court, in a case that was closely watched and certain to gen-
erate significant public attention. Some have read his avoidance 
canon opinions less charitably, suggesting that he has used the 
canon to perform radical surgery on statutory text, and that he 
has done so in order to pave the way for future constitutional in-
validation.210 I find this sinister view to be a bit extreme—
indeed, there is nothing in NFIB that suggests the Court will 
invalidate the Affordable Care Act on constitutional grounds in 
the future.211 I discuss Roberts’s relatively high rate of reference 
to substantive canons in general in Part II.B.1. 
3. Approximating intent. 
The Roberts Court also has applied substantive canons in a 
manner that seeks to approximate Congress’s intent in run-of-the-
mill cases that are not politically salient. Consider, for example, 
 
 209 See note 12. 
 210 See Re, 17 Green Bag 2d at 175 (cited in note 19). Such criticisms have focused on 
the fact that the Court used the avoidance canon to punt deciding the constitutionality of 
the Voting Rights Act in NAMUDNO, only to turn around a few years later and invali-
date the coverage formula in § 4(b) of the VRA in Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 
S Ct 2612, 2630–31 (2013). See Re, 17 Green Bag 2d at 175 (cited in note 19); Katyal and 
Schmidt, 128 Harv L Rev at 2111 (cited in note 7). But even if we assume that the 
NAMUDNO Court invoked the avoidance canon to set up its eventual invalidation of the 
coverage formula in § 4(b) of the VRA (an assumption that ignores the fact that four lib-
eral justices voted with the majority in NAMUDNO and that Congress could have 
changed its coverage formula in the years between NAMUDNO and Shelby County), see 
NAMUDNO, 557 US at 195, this does not mean that the Court uses the avoidance canon 
strategically as a general matter, or in its other cases. 
 211 On the contrary, in King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480 (2015), the Court—led by 
Roberts—emphasized Congress’s purpose and design in interpreting a provision of the 
Affordable Care Act that allows tax subsidies to be paid to individuals who enroll in a 
health insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State” to apply to indi-
viduals enrolled through federally operated exchanges. See id at 2495–96. The Court 
stressed that to construe the statute otherwise would bring about “the type of calami-
tous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid” and argued that “Congress passed the 
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all 
possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and 
avoids the latter.” Id at 2496. 
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Howard Delivery Service, Inc v Zurich American Insurance Co,212 
in which the Court invoked a substantive canon dictating that 
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code should be narrowly con-
strued.213 Howard involved a Bankruptcy Code section that “ac-
cords a priority, among unsecured creditors’ claims, for unpaid 
‘wages, salaries, or commissions’ and for unpaid contributions to 
‘an employee benefit plan.’”214 It was uncontested that the provi-
sion covered “fringe benefits that complete a pay package”—for 
example, retirement plans and “group health, life, and disability 
insurance.”215 Howard raised the question whether the priority 
provision “also encompasse[d] claims for unpaid premiums on a 
policy purchased by an employer to cover its workers’ compensa-
tion liability.”216 The Court held that the priority provision did 
not cover such unpaid premiums.217 In so ruling, it discussed the 
evolutionary history of the priority provision, citing legislative 
history explaining that the provision covers “health insurance 
programs, life insurance plans, pension funds, and all other 
forms of employee compensation that [are] not in the form of 
wages.”218 The Court then observed that workers’ compensation 
does not compensate employees for work performed but, rather, 
for on-the-job injuries, and that workers’ compensation regimes 
substitute for tort liability, not for wage payments.219 Finally, 
the Court emphasized that one of the Bankruptcy Code’s under-
lying objectives is to ensure the “equal distribution” of payments 
to all creditors and invoked the “corollary” presumption that 
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code allowing preferences must be 
narrowly construed.220 
Throughout its discussion, the Court’s focus was on Congress’s 
intent and design with respect to the scope of the priority provi-
sion. Unsatisfied that that intent and design encompassed the 
premium payments at issue in the case, the Court fell back on 
the Bankruptcy Code’s underlying equal distribution purpose, 
and a substantive canon based on that underlying purpose. The 
 
 212 547 US 651 (2006). 
 213 See id at 667. 
 214 Id at 654 (citation omitted), quoting 11 USC § 507(a)(4)(A), (a)(5). 
 215 Howard, 547 US at 654. 
 216 Id at 654–55. 
 217 See id at 655. 
 218 Id at 658–59 (brackets in original). 
 219 See Howard, 547 US at 662–65. 
 220 Id at 667. 
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Court thus seemed to use the “narrow construction of Bankruptcy 
Code preferences” canon as a means to effectuate Congress’s in-
tent and purpose—not as a vehicle for judicial abrogation of leg-
islative policy preferences. 
A number of the Court’s preemption cases also contain judi-
cial efforts to divine congressional intent, often while invoking 
the presumption against preemption. In Wyeth v Levine,221 for 
example, a majority of the Court concluded that the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act222 (FDCA) does not preempt state 
law tort claims alleging that manufacturers placed inadequate 
warnings on drug labels.223 In so ruling, the Court invoked the 
presumption against preemption in conjunction with the Act’s 
purpose, legislative history, congressional intent, and other can-
ons.224 Notably, the Court emphasized that Congress enacted the 
FDCA in order to “bolster consumer protection against harmful 
products”—quoting congressional hearing testimony and floor 
statements to show that Congress intended to continue to allow 
state law claims of this kind when it enacted the FDCA.225 The 
Court also stressed Congress’s “awareness of the prevalence of 
state tort litigation” and argued that Congress’s failure to ex-
pressly preempt state tort law on inadequate warnings in labels 
despite such awareness “is powerful evidence that Congress did 
not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring 
drug safety and effectiveness.”226 Thus, far from using the preemp-
tion canon as a blunt instrument to curtail congressional intent in 
furtherance of judicially preferred policies, the Court employed the 
canon to help reinforce its sense of Congress’s intent. Moreover, it 
did not use the canon to supersede statutory purpose, legislative 
history, or other indicia of legislative intent; instead, it paid signif-
icant attention to these intent-focused interpretive resources and 
employed a substantive canon to achieve a result consistent with 
the reading dictated by these other resources. 
Similarly, in Riegel v Medtronic, Inc,227 the Court considered 
whether the Medical Device Amendments of 1976228 (MDA)’s 
 
 221 555 US 555 (2009). 
 222 52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq. 
 223 See Wyeth, 555 US at 558–59. 
 224 See id at 566–68. 
 225 Id at 574 & n 7. 
 226 Id at 574–75 (emphasis added). 
 227 552 US 312 (2008). 
 228 Pub L No 94-295, 90 Stat 539. 
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preemption clause bars common-law claims challenging the de-
sign or labeling of a medical device once the design or label has 
gained premarket approval from the FDA.229 This time, the Court 
concluded that the federal statute did preempt the state law 
claims.230 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion ar-
gued that the MDA should not be read to preempt state common-
law claims seeking compensation for injuries caused by defec-
tively designed or labeled medical devices because Congress did 
not intend for the MDA to radically curtail state common-law 
suits; rather, in enacting the MDA, Congress was trying to 
preempt only state premarket regulation of medical devices.231 
The dissent began its analysis with the presumption against 
preemption and then invoked House and Senate reports describ-
ing several medical device failures and resulting injuries that 
motivated Congress to enact the MDA,232 as well as comments by 
the Act’s sponsor indicating that “[this] legislation is written so 
that the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer.”233 
The dissent also made a “dog that did not bark” legislative in-
tent argument, insisting that “[i]t is difficult to believe that 
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial 
recourse for large numbers of consumers injured by defective 
medical devices.”234 Thus, the dissent used the preemption canon 
in tandem with and as a means to fulfill congressional intent, not 
as a tool for trumping legislative intent with judicial preferences. 
* * * 
As noted above, in offering these examples of the justices’ 
attentiveness to congressional intent, I do not mean to suggest 
that the Court does not at times use substantive canons in a 
manner that defeats or contradicts congressional intent. My ar-
gument is based purely on examples, and opposing examples 
surely exist. Indeed, some substantive canons are by nature de-
signed to check Congress and, therefore, almost always are ap-
plied in a manner that restrains congressional intent. Federalism 
 
 229 See Riegel, 552 US at 315. 
 230 See id at 330. 
 231 See id at 333 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 232 See id at 334–36 & n 5 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 233 Riegel, 552 US at 336 n 4 (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Medical Devices 
Amendments of 1975, S 510, 94th Cong, 1st Sess, in 121 Cong Rec 10688 (Apr 17, 1975) 
(statement of Sen Kennedy). 
 234 Riegel, 552 US at 337 (Ginsburg dissenting) (quotation marks omitted). 
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clear statement rules impose deliberate obstacles to congres-
sional interference with state authority, and the Roberts Court 
sometimes applied these without focusing on congressional in-
tent.235 The rule of lenity, likewise, gives the benefit of the doubt 
to criminal defendants when Congress has not been clear 
enough about the reach of a criminal statute, even though it is 
almost always the case that Congress would prefer for the bene-
fit of the doubt to go to the government.236 My point in providing 
the case examples in this Section is not to argue that the con-
ventional view that judges use substantive canons to defeat leg-
islative intent is wrong per se but, rather, that it is overstated. 
Substantive canons can be used, and sometimes are used, to de-
feat congressional intent—but they also regularly are used to fur-
ther congressional intent. In other words, there is nothing inher-
ent about substantive canons as an interpretive resource that 
necessitates that they will be used to contradict legislative prefer-
ences. Moreover, this is true even with respect to substantive 
canons that are designed to check Congress, such as the avoid-
ance canon and the presumption against federal preemption of 
state laws, as the cases discussed in this Section show. Finally, it 
is significant that two of the Roberts Court’s most frequent 
 
 235 See generally, for example, Arlington Central, 548 US 291; Rapanos, 547 US 715. 
In Arlington Central, for example, the Court interpreted a provision of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) that authorizes courts to award “reasonable at-
torneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents who prevail in lawsuits against their chil-
dren’s school boards. 20 USC § 1415(i)(3)(B). At issue was whether costs associated with 
hiring expert witnesses and consultants who assisted in the parents’ litigation against 
the school boards were included in this provision. A conference committee report on the 
IDEA stated that “[t]he conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the 
costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs 
of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the . . . 
case.” Arlington Central, 548 US at 302 (bracket omitted and ellipsis in original), quoting 
Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 Conference Report, HR Conf Rep No 99-
687, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 1807, 1808. The Court re-
jected this on-point legislative history as well as arguments that the IDEA’s purpose to 
“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate pub-
lic education,” 20 USC § 1400(d)(1)(A), could be fulfilled only by reimbursing parents for 
expert testimony necessary to demonstrate the child’s disability and need for accommo-
dations. See Arlington Central, 548 US at 302–04. Instead, it invoked and relied heavily 
on a substantive canon—a clear statement rule demanding that statutes enacted under 
the Spending Clause be crystal clear about any costs they might impose on state and lo-
cal governments. See id at 296–98, 303–04. This is a clear example of a case in which a 
substantive canon was used in the manner contemplated by the conventional wisdom—
that is, to trump Congress’s clearly expressed intent to include such expert fees in the 
provision allowing for reallocation of costs. 
 236 See Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 957 (cited in note 25). 
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employers of substantive canons—Stevens and Sotomayor—are 
intentionalist judges who view congressional intent as the lode-
star of statutory interpretation. The fact that these intent-
seeking justices invoked substantive canons at higher rates than 
did their textualist counterparts is strong evidence that the con-
ventional account misses something important about textual-
ism’s relationship to substantive canons237 and about the rela-
tionship between substantive canons and congressional intent. 
III.  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The data reported in Part II have important theoretical im-
plications, calling into question several conventional assump-
tions about substantive canons and the work that they perform 
in statutory interpretation. This Part explores the theoretical 
upshot of the data regarding the Roberts Court’s use of substan-
tive canons. It argues that the data suggest that substantive 
canons have received a “bum rap” from academics, who have 
overestimated the role that such canons play in the Court’s 
statutory interpretation cases—and that such canons may not 
be as dangerous or dastardly as commentators have painted 
them out to be. The Article posits that one reason for the mis-
match between academic perception and reality likely is an ex-
cessive scholarly focus on the federalism clear statement rules, 
which represent only a fraction of all the substantive canons 
employed by the Court.238 The data also suggest that Justice 
Scalia has received a bit of a bum rap for ostensibly using sub-
stantive canons aggressively, while criticizing them in theory; in 
reality, he invoked such canons in only nine of eighty-two opin-
ions authored during the period studied and relied primarily on 
them in only three opinions. 
The data also have important implications for two leading 
theories of statutory interpretation. First, they undermine long-
standing scholarly assumptions that substantive canons provide 
a necessary “escape valve” for textualist judges who find a stat-
ute’s plain meaning unpalatable. It turns out that, in practice, 
textualist judges invoke substantive canons rarely, and less of-
ten than some of their intentionalist colleagues. Further, during 
the period studied, textualist judges invoked substantive canons 
 
 237 See Parts III.A–B. 
 238 See Part II.B.2. 
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to support liberal outcomes in a substantial minority of cases—
sometimes at rates equal to the rates at which they invoked 
such canons to support conservative outcomes.239 
At the same time, the data lend some support to pragmatic 
theories of statutory interpretation—demonstrating that practi-
cal reasoning, along with the Court’s own statutory precedents, 
plays a gap-filling or escape valve role similar to that which 
scholars have attributed to substantive canons. This Part con-
cludes by discussing how the substantive canons employed most 
often by the Roberts Court align with state and federal legisla-
tors’ preferences regarding interpretive methodology and what 
the substantive canon data might add to recent discussions about 
methodological stare decisis—the suggestion that federal courts 
should adopt a binding statutory interpretation methodology. 
A. A Bum Rap 
As discussed in Part I.A, scholars of different theoretical 
stripes tend to share the views that textualist judges employ 
substantive canons regularly, that there is theoretical tension 
between substantive canons and textualism, and that substan-
tive canons play a significant role in the interpretation of stat-
utes. Further, many scholars view substantive canons as trump 
cards that judges illegitimately whip out to justify a construction 
that conflicts with the one dictated by other interpretive re-
sources, including legislative intent. 
But the data and doctrinal analysis of the Roberts Court’s 
first six and a half terms suggest that these scholarly assump-
tions may be overstated—and that, as an interpretive tool, sub-
stantive canons may not be as nefarious, or the Court may not 
be as wily in its use of them, as scholars have imagined. Sub-
stantive canons are infrequently invoked, and even when in-
voked, they are relied on only in passing or as a secondary in-
terpretive resource in the vast majority of opinions (71.3 
percent).240 Indeed, the much-maligned classic case in which the 
Court pulls a substantive canon out of a hat and uses it to reject 
a statutory reading dictated by the statute’s text, purpose, and 
other traditional tools may be the exception rather than the 
norm. 
 
 239 See Table 4. 
 240 See Tables 2 and 3. 
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Of course, there is a difference between measuring the 
Court’s quantitative use of substantive canons and measuring 
its qualitative use of such canons. The fact that the justices in-
frequently invoke substantive canons does not mean that such 
canons are not powerful when used; nor do the data showing 
that the justices rely “primarily” on such canons in only 28.7 
percent of opinions and that they appear to have used substan-
tive canons to defeat congressional intent in only fifteen cases 
mean that those particular cases are not worth worrying about. 
Indeed, some may argue that even one nefarious use of a sub-
stantive canon to circumvent the statute’s plain meaning or con-
gressional intent is odious—and can work sufficient harm to jus-
tify the academic outcry against such canons. Some might even 
view the Court’s infrequent and inconsistent use of substantive 
canons as more problematic than the widespread use of such 
canons would be, because infrequent use fails to put Congress on 
notice about the background norms that might suddenly pop up 
to do significant work in the odd case, and thereby increases the 
likelihood that Congress’s intent will be undermined. These are 
legitimate worries. I do not necessarily disagree with individual-
ized criticisms of the Court’s use of particular substantive can-
ons in particular cases, or mean to suggest that substantive 
canons are harmless merely because they are infrequently 
used. My point, rather, is that the data suggest that there is 
nothing inherently harmful, or intent defeating, or plain mean-
ing eschewing, about substantive canons as an interpretive re-
source—and that the prevailing scholarly wisdom about sub-
stantive canons as a category has swept too broadly. 
In addition, textualist judges and the substantive canons as 
a group may deserve greater credit for neutrality than scholars 
or the conventional account has given them. The ideological data 
reported in Tables 4 and 5, showing that the Roberts Court’s 
textualist and textualist-leaning justices—who also are its most 
conservative justices—have employed substantive canons to 
reach liberal results in a substantial percentage of opinions,241 
are stunning. The data suggest that substantive canons may 
have some, at least mild, constraining effect on the conservative 
justices, and that the standard scholarly account that the jus-
tices wield substantive canons in a purely ideological manner, to 
 
 241 See Tables 4 and 5. 
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justify judicial policy preferences, is not accurate in many cases. 
Indeed, scholars may owe both the conservative justices and the 
substantive canons, as an interpretive tool, an apology—and the 
latter a more charitable place in the statutory interpretation 
annals. 
Scalia in particular may deserve more credit than scholars 
have given him for being consistent, in practice, with his theoreti-
cal criticism of substantive canons. As noted in Part II.B, during 
the Roberts Court’s first six and a half terms, Scalia rarely in-
voked substantive canons in the opinions he authored (11.0 per-
cent).242 If we remove cases in which Scalia authored an opinion 
invoking the rule of lenity—a substantive canon he has argued 
is justified based on its antiquity243—then his rate of use for this 
interpretive resource falls to 7.3 percent.244 Further, Scalia 
joined or authored an opinion that invoked substantive canons 
in only 16.9 percent (50 of 296) of the cases in the data set,245 
and only 3 (out of 9) of the opinions he authored that invoked 
substantive canons relied on a substantive canon as a primary 
interpretive resource.246 Thus, Scalia seems to have hewed more 
closely to his theoretical criticism of substantive canons, at least 
in recent years, than scholars have given him credit for. 
The puzzle thus arises: What accounts for the mismatch be-
tween the conventional view of substantive canons and actual 
judicial practice during the Roberts Court’s first six and a half 
years? Or for the differences in how many substantive canons 
the Court invoked during the Burger/Rehnquist Court years 
versus the Roberts Court years? One explanation may be that 
much of the conventional account—and criticism—regarding 
substantive canons seems to have been formulated in response 
to the Court’s creation and aggressive application of several new 
“super-strong” clear statement rules during the 1980s and 
 
 242 See Table 1. 
 243 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 2). 
 244 See Appendix. As the Appendix shows, there were four cases in which Scalia au-
thored an opinion that invoked the rule of lenity; however, in one of these cases, he also 
invoked a federalism clear statement rule. The 7.3 percent figure reflects the percentage 
of opinions authored by Scalia that invoked a substantive canon other than the rule of 
lenity (including the one case that also invoked the federalism clear statement rule). 
 245 See Table 4. 
 246 See generally Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247 (2010); United 
States v Santos, 553 US 507 (2008); Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 132 S Ct 
1367 (2012). 
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1990s.247 As Professors Eskridge and Frickey have pointed out, 
these clear statement rules were a “remarkable” and “striking 
innovation,” transforming background norms about federalism 
and sovereign immunity into nearly insurmountable obstacles to 
federal legislation that seeks to supersede state laws or waive 
the government’s immunity from suit.248 Clear statement rules 
also are extraordinarily countermajoritarian and dismissive of 
congressional intent in that they “permit the Court to override 
probable congressional preferences in statutory interpretation in 
favor of norms and values favored by the Court.”249 Worse, super-
strong clear statement rules sanction this judicial displacement of 
congressional preferences with virtually no notice to Congress, 
which may be aware of the background norm the Court seeks to 
enforce but receives no warning that it must be exceptionally 
clear about its intent to override that norm in the text of the 
statute—rather than, say, in the legislative history—until the 
Court issues its decision several years later. As Eskridge and 
Frickey have observed, this notice problem is particularly dis-
turbing when the Court applies a new super-strong clear state-
ment rule to an older statute, enacted during an era when dif-
ferent statutory interpretation techniques predominated and 
courts rarely required clear statements of any kind in the stat-
ute’s text.250 
Given the radical effects worked by clear statement rules, 
the Rehnquist Court’s invention of several new and “super-
strong” versions of these rules garnered significant academic 
attention251 and criticism and may—uncoincidentally—have 
 
 247 For an example of such a rule, see generally United States v Nordic Village, Inc, 
503 US 30 (1992) (creating a super-strong clear statement rule for waiving federal sover-
eign immunity). 
 248 Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 597 (cited in note 7). 
 249 Id at 638. 
 250 See id at 622. 
 251 For just a few examples, see id at 597, 619–29; Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 
1655 (cited in note 42). See also generally John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and 
the Constitution, 110 Colum L Rev 399 (2010); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, 
and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 Harv L Rev 1959 (1994); Larry J. Obhof, 
Federalism, I Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of Federalism Principles through Pre-
sumptions and Clear Statement Rules, 2004 Mich St L Rev 123; John Copeland Nagle, 
Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis L Rev 771; 
William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of Clear 
Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 Ind L J 211 (1982); William P. Marshall, The 
Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DePaul L 
Rev 345 (1989). 
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distorted scholars’ views of substantive canons as a category. 
That is, scholars may have been a little too quick to attribute the 
characteristics associated with clear statement rules—for exam-
ple, their centrality to textualist jurisprudence and their inat-
tentiveness to congressional intent—to all substantive canons. 
Moreover, the sheer shock value of the Court’s creation and use 
of these “super-strong” clear statement canons during the early 
Rehnquist Court years may have created a heightened percep-
tion of the amount of work that substantive canons as a whole 
perform in the Court’s statutory interpretations. I say “height-
ened perception” because, in reality, the Rehnquist Court may 
not have used substantive canons more often than the Roberts 
Court; recall that the Brudney-Ditslear study found low overall 
rates of judicial references to substantive canons in employment 
law cases decided by the Rehnquist Court during its 1986 
through 2002 terms (15.6 percent).252 
Of course, there also are other factors that may explain why 
substantive canons seem to be doing less work on the Roberts 
Court than scholars have assumed, and why such canons are be-
ing used less frequently and with less variety by the Roberts 
Court than during the early years of the Rehnquist Court.253 One 
such factor is that federalism clear statement rules may have 
been in their heyday during the early Rehnquist Court—the 
time period that Eskridge and Frickey happened to study—so 
that such canons may have been used more frequently and in 
greater variety during the period they studied than during other 
periods. That is, the early Rehnquist Court may have perceived 
a need to stake out strong protections for underenforced consti-
tutional principles254 related to federalism and sovereign immun-
ity and may have acted with vigor and urgency to articulate 
canons that helped it do so in its early years. By the time of the 
early Roberts Court, twenty years later, those battles may have 
been fought and won, so that the members of the Court—even 
those who employed substantive canons energetically during the 
early Rehnquist years—have found less need to create or invoke 
such canons than they once did. Relatedly, because federalism 
 
 252 See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26). 
 253 For the range of substantive canons used by the Rehnquist Court, see generally 
Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev 593 (cited in note 7). 
 254 Consider Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underen-
forced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212 (1978) (developing the concept of “un-
derenforced constitutional norms”). 
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clear statement rules are now well established, cases involving 
such rules may no longer need to be decided by the Supreme 
Court. That is, lower courts may be applying such clear state-
ment rules to resolve cases before they even reach the Court; if 
this is true, then focusing on the Supreme Court’s docket could 
understate the practical importance of substantive canons—
particularly ones that establish bright-line rules that are easy 
for lower courts to implement. 
Another, related, explanation could be that the Supreme 
Court has not undergone a significant political or ideological 
shift from the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court—and, in-
deed, seems to have become more solidly conservative since the 
early Rehnquist years (1986 through 1991).255 Thus, the canons 
created, or modified, by the Rehnquist Court may suit the justices 
on the Roberts Court—or at least a majority of those justices—
quite well, and the justices accordingly may see little need to in-
vent new canons as the Rehnquist Court once did. This could 
explain the low incidence of “new canon” creation observed in my 
study, and perhaps also the decrease in the variety of different 
canons invoked—that is, the current Court may be well settled 
into a comfort zone with respect to the canons it prefers to in-
voke, whereas the Rehnquist Court may have been in a substan-
tive canon transition period of sorts. Finally, part of the expla-
nation for the differences in findings may lie in the fact that, 
since 2010, the US Supreme Court and Congress have been 
more closely aligned, politically and ideologically (skewing con-
servative), than they were during the first decade of the 
Rehnquist Court—when both houses of Congress were controlled 
by liberal majorities, while the Court was moderately conserva-
tive.256 To the extent that the Court uses substantive canons to 
 
 255 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 
Wayne L Rev 947, 948 (2008) (calling the Roberts Court “the most conservative Court 
since the mid-1930s”); Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman, and Nancy Staudt, On the Capacity 
of the Roberts Court to Generate Consequential Precedent, 86 NC L Rev 1299, 1321 (2008) 
(reporting an empirical finding that “the Roberts Court is significantly more conservative 
than the average Court sitting since the 1953 Term”); Adam Liptak, Court under Roberts 
Is Most Conservative in Decades (NY Times, July 24, 2010), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html (visited Apr 9, 2017) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable). 
 256 See, for example, Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee 
Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737, 783 n 205 (2011) 
(describing “the ideological distance between the Roberts Court and the Democratic 
Congress” before the 2010 elections). 
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cut back the scope of legislation, it may see less need to use such 
canons in times of political alignment with Congress. Note, how-
ever, that while this theory is consistent with the Roberts 
Court’s use of substantive canons in cases such as Carhart,257 it 
cannot explain Chief Justice Roberts’s use of substantive canons 
in cases like NAMUDNO258 or NFIB,259 which upheld statutes 
enacted by Democrat-controlled Congresses. 
B. Textualism’s “Escape Valve”? 
As discussed in Part I.A, leading legislation scholars have 
theorized that substantive canons operate as an “escape valve” 
for textualism, providing a justification—couched in time-
honored rules—for construing a statute in a manner that con-
flicts with its plain meaning.260 However, the findings reported 
in Part II showing that textualist and textualist-leaning justices 
infrequently invoked substantive canons call this assumption into 
question.261 Moreover, the findings raise the following queries: If 
substantive canons do not regularly serve as an escape valve for 
textualist justices, does this mean that textualism in fact has no 
escape valve? Or is some other interpretive tool or technique do-
ing the work of filling in gaps and providing an escape mecha-
nism for textualism? 
More granular analysis of the Roberts Court’s cases sug-
gests that textualism may in fact have an alternate escape 
valve, or valves—namely, Supreme Court precedent, practical 
consequences, and perhaps also the common law and other stat-
utory tools. In order to explore the answers to the above ques-
tions, I examined the thirty-six out of eighty-two cases in the data 
set authored by Scalia that did not reference statutory text or 
the plain meaning rule and the twenty-nine out of seventy-seven 
cases in the data set authored by Justice Thomas that did not 
reference statutory text or plain meaning and sought to identify 
what interpretive resources these textualist justices relied on 
when they did not base their statutory constructions on text or 
plain meaning. In these sixty-five cases, Scalia and Thomas 
 
 257 See text accompanying notes 180–92. 
 258 See note 210 and text accompanying notes 102–05. 
 259 See Part II.C.2. 
 260 See, for example, Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regula-
tion at 743 (cited in note 1); Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1). 
 261 See Table 1 and Part II.B. 
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overwhelmingly relied on Supreme Court precedent in lieu of 
statutory text or plain meaning; in a handful of cases, they also 
referenced practical consequences and, to a lesser extent, the 
common law and other statutes.262 If we expand this closer study 
to examine the 333 opinions in the entire data set that did not 
reference text or plain meaning (authored by all of the justices), 
Supreme Court precedent and practical consequences again 
stand out as the two most frequently referenced alternate inter-
pretive resources.263 Thus, Supreme Court precedent seems to be 
the real gap-filling interpretive tool in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
followed by practical-consequences-based reasoning. 
The Supreme Court’s frequent use of practical consequences 
in statutory interpretation cases has been explored in several 
earlier empirical studies.264 But the Court’s use of its own prece-
dent as an interpretive resource has gone largely unstudied.265 
Scholars may thus far have ignored the Court’s use of its own 
precedents to construe statutes because precedent is such an in-
trinsic part of judging and judicial opinion writing that the Court’s 
reliance on it has hardly seemed remarkable. But the data from 
the Roberts Court’s first several terms—showing Supreme 
Court precedent to be the interpretive resource most frequently 
invoked across justices266—suggest that it is important for 
 
 262 Of the non–plain meaning cases authored by Scalia or Thomas, thirty-one out of 
sixty-five (47.7 percent) relied on Supreme Court precedent, eleven (16.9 percent) refer-
enced practical consequences, eight (12.3 percent) referenced common-law precedent, 
seven (10.8 percent) referenced other statutes, seven (10.8 percent) referenced substan-
tive canons, and one referenced no other interpretive tools (1.5 percent). Notably, many 
of the practical-consequences-referencing cases also referenced precedent; overall, one-
third of precedent-referencing cases also referenced other interpretive tools. 
 263 The justices referenced precedent in 179 out of 333 (53.8 percent) of these opin-
ions, and practical consequences in 111 (33.3 percent) of these opinions. Of these opin-
ions, 59 referenced both precedent and practical consequences. By way of comparison, 
only 43 of these 333 opinions referenced substantive canons (12.9 percent), 75 referenced 
legislative history (22.5 percent), 52 referenced intent (15.6 percent), 77 referenced statu-
tory purpose (23.1 percent), 38 referenced common-law precedent (11.4 percent), 50 refer-
enced other statutes (15.0 percent), and 29 referenced dictionary definitions (8.7 percent). 
 264 See, for example, Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 5, 12, 18, 21 (cited in note 89) (dis-
cussing the use of “judicially-selected policy norms”); Zeppos, 70 Tex L Rev at 1107–13 
(cited in note 89) (discussing the Court’s use of practical considerations in statutory in-
terpretation); Krishnakumar, 62 Hastings L J at 237 (cited in note 87) (discussing the 
frequency of the Court’s use of practical consequences as a tool of statutory interpreta-
tion compared to other interpretive tools). 
 265 Professor Lawrence M. Solan’s recent article is a notable exception. See generally 
Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 NC L Rev 1165 (2016). 
 266 As Table 1 shows, Scalia, Thomas, and Justices Alito and Kagan invoked the 
text / plain meaning tool more often than they referenced Supreme Court precedent, but 
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scholars to examine critically how the Court uses such prece-
dents when tackling a new statutory construction. Does the 
Court use its own prior interpretations to trump other interpre-
tive tools, or does the Court use such precedents to corroborate 
the reading dictated by other interpretive resources? How often 
does the Court employ statutory stare decisis to decide a case? 
Are arguments from precedent typically used to “escape” the 
statute’s plain meaning, to reinforce it, or simply to fill in gaps 
when there is no plain meaning? These are just a few of the 
many questions that bear further exploration. At bottom, statu-
tory interpretation theory lacks a good account of whether the 
Court uses its own precedents merely to supply authority for 
other canons and interpretive tools (for example, as authority for 
the rule of lenity or to explain what noscitur a sociis means) or 
as an independent interpretive tool that itself dictates a particu-
lar statutory construction. 
The discovery that textualist judges employ Supreme Court 
precedent more often than substantive canons when construing 
statutes that do not seem to have a plain meaning also could 
have important implications for textualism’s claims to predicta-
bility and determinacy. Here is what I mean: Textualists long 
have argued that their approach to statutory interpretation is 
the most legitimate because it constrains judges, leading 
straightforwardly to the one correct reading of a statute.267 Crit-
ics have countered that textualism’s dependence on substantive 
canons undermines such claims to determinacy because sub-
stantive canons are policy based and unpredictable and because 
they empower judges to manipulate outcomes268—points that 
prominent textualists, including Scalia, have conceded.269 
 
the other seven justices invoked the Court’s own precedent most often. Further, these 
four justices all invoked Supreme Court precedent in over 40.0 percent of the cases each 
of them authored. For Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, Supreme Court precedent was the tool 
used second most often; for Kagan, it was used fourth most often. See Table 1. 
 267 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 16–18 (cited in note 2); 
Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme 
Court, 8 Tex Rev L & Polit 261, 263–64 (2004) (arguing that courts should adopt textual-
ism to “eliminate unpredictability and confusion” and install “a disciplined interpretative 
approach”). 
 268 See, for example, Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regula-
tion at 743 (cited in note 1). See also note 43. 
 269 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 28 (cited in note 2); 
Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1). 
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The surprising finding that the Roberts Court relies on the 
Court’s own precedents to fill in gaps in statutory context far 
more often than it relies on substantive canons could change 
the contours of this debate in important ways. On the one hand, 
Supreme Court precedent cannot be invented and reinvented 
the way that substantive canons sometimes can—for example, 
the federalism clear statement rules in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
this sense, the Court’s heavy reliance on its own precedents may 
be less problematic than similar reliance on substantive canons. 
On the other hand, reliance on prior judicial decisions is a very 
common-law, judge-centered approach to statutory interpreta-
tion—not an approach that puts the legislature at its center, as 
statutory interpreters are supposed to do. Indeed, most founda-
tional theories of statutory interpretation rest, to some degree, 
on a faithful agent model of the Court-Congress relationship—
one that envisions the Court as the agent in a master-servant 
relationship with Congress.270 Textualism, notably, claims that it 
is more faithful to the legislature than approaches that look to 
statutory purpose or legislative history, because it pays close at-
tention to the text that is the product of compromise among dif-
ferently motivated legislators, rather than elevating the views of 
some legislators over others’ as suits the judge’s fancy.271 But 
textualism’s form of faithfulness, it turns out, relies significantly 
on a judicially generated interpretive resource—the Court’s own 
past precedents. This is significant because there is, of course, 
substantial room for different interpretations of what precedents 
mean when applied to new circumstances—rendering the use 
of past precedent as a guide to statutory interpretation a noto-
riously unpredictable and judge-empowering exercise.272 In-
deed, legal realist Professor Karl Llewellyn delineated no fewer 
than sixty-four different ways in which judges can apply a prior 
precedent.273 
 
 270 See, for example, Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 907, 913–14 (cited in 
note 25). 
 271 See, for example, John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional 
Structure, 120 Harv L Rev 1161, 1162 (2007). 
 272 See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U Colo L Rev 225, 232–
37 (1999) (arguing that stare decisis in statutory cases gives the courts a lawmaking role 
and that this distinguishes our common-law system from code-based legal systems). 
 273 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 77–91 (Little, 
Brown 1960). Llewellyn’s list has been described as comprising “eight ways to follow 
but constrict a precedent, eight to stand by it, thirty-two to expand it, twelve ways to 
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Further, even before judges get to the point of arguing over 
a precedent’s meaning, they have significant discretion to decide 
whether a precedent is even applicable in a particular case, just 
as they have discretion to decide whether a substantive canon is 
applicable in a particular case. Recent studies are just beginning 
to explore the ways in which the members of the Supreme Court 
disagree, or “duel,” over the application of the same precedent in 
the same case.274 But the lesson from this Article may simply be 
that more analysis of this kind is necessary—that is, that schol-
ars need to pay closer attention to how textualists (and other ju-
rists) employ the Court’s prior precedents, no less than they 
have paid attention in the past to textualists’ use of substantive 
canons. Ultimately, whether textualists supplement textual 
analysis with substantive canons or with precedent, they are 
supplementing with a judicial source rather than a legislative 
source—and that, in itself, is both enormously interesting and 
potentially worrisome. 
C. Purposivism 
This Article’s findings also have important theoretical im-
plications for other leading theories of statutory interpretation. 
Purposivism is an interpretive approach that encourages jurists 
to interpret a statute by identifying the statute’s purpose and se-
lecting the meaning that best effectuates that purpose.275 Pur-
posive statutory interpretation typically involves inquiries into 
legislative history, the societal problem that prompted the legis-
lature to enact the statute, legislative intent, and other sources 
that might shed light on a statute’s objectives. It can entail 
guesswork and judicial discretion, but is often defended on the 
ground that reliance on legislative history and purpose helps re-
strict judicial discretion and fulfill congressional intent.276 
Purposivism once was the dominant approach to statutory 
interpretation, but over the past few decades it has come under 
 
avoid it and four to kill it.” E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 Wayne L Rev 
1043, 1051 (1975). 
 274 See generally, for example, Krishnakumar, 65 Duke L J 909 (cited in note 94); 
Solan, 94 NC L Rev 1165 (cited in note 265). 
 275 See Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in 
the Making and Application of Law 1374 (Foundation Press 1994) (William N. Eskridge 
Jr and Philip P. Frickey, eds). 
 276 See John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 Nev L J 1, 2 (2005); Eskridge, 
Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1548–49 (cited in note 2). 
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significant attack.277 The criticism has come both from textual-
ism and from public-choice theorists, who have condemned it as 
providing a rose-colored-glasses view of the legislative process. 
Both sets of critics have emphasized the open-endedness of the 
search for statutory purpose and have argued that purpose-
based interpretation enables judges to import their personal pol-
icy preferences into the statute.278 
The data regarding the Roberts Court’s substantive canon use 
have at least two important implications for purposivism. First 
and foremost, the data show that despite textualism’s thirty-year-
old campaign against legislative history—and despite scholars’ 
warnings that substantive canon use has increased while legis-
lative history use has decreased279—substantive canons have not 
displaced legislative history on the modern Supreme Court. As 
noted earlier, eight of the eleven justices who have served on the 
Roberts Court—including conservative, textualist-leaning Justices 
Alito and Kennedy—referenced legislative history more often 
than they referenced substantive canons in the opinions they 
authored.280 Moreover, a comparison of my data to Professors 
Brudney and Ditslear’s data from the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts shows that the conventional scholarly wisdom is only 
half correct: legislative history use did decline significantly from 
the Burger Court (46.6 percent) to the Rehnquist (27.7 percent) 
 
 277 See Roger Colinvaux, Note, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good 
Judging under a Textualist Lens, 72 Ind L J 1133, 1139 (1997) (stating that purposivism 
“came under heavy attack” in the 1970s); Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Envi-
ronmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003-04 Term, 42 Houston L Rev 565, 574 (2005) 
(“Both intentionalism and purposivism came under increasing criticism in the 1980s.”); 
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2415–17 (2003) (criti-
cizing the reliability of using legislative history in statutory interpretation). See also 
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum L Rev 70, 
103–04 (2006) (arguing that relying on the text is the best way to make sense of the leg-
islative process); William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation 
as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321, 333–37 (1990) (describing multiple problems 
with the purposivist approach). 
 278 See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 25–29 (cited in 
note 162) (criticizing purposivism and arguing that the application of statutory purpose 
is dependent on the perspective of the interpreter); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History 
and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan 
L Rev 1833, 1884–85 (1998) (criticizing the “malleability of purposive interpretation”); 
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 77 Minn L Rev 241, 250–51 (1992) (describing flaws in the purposive ap-
proach that could lead principled judges to reach the wrong results). 
 279 See Part I.A. 
 280 See Table 1. 
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and Roberts Courts (25.0 percent),281 but it has not been replaced 
by substantive canon use. Indeed, while substantive canon use 
increased from 8.3 percent during the Burger Court to 15.6 per-
cent during the Rehnquist Court and 14.4 percent during the 
Roberts Court,282 this 6.1 percentage point increase hardly makes 
up for the 21.6 percentage point drop in legislative history refer-
ences since the Burger Court, nor does it show that substantive 
canon use has surged ahead of legislative history use. 
This is significant because, as scholars have noted, an im-
portant part of what divides textualists from purposivists on the 
modern US Supreme Court supposedly is disagreement about 
what interpretive tools should be consulted when there is textual 
ambiguity (with textualists putting substantive canons second, 
while purposivists list legislative history and purpose in that 
slot).283 The Roberts Court data suggest that scholars have been 
too quick to sound the alarm bells about the death of legislative 
history at the hand of substantive canons, or about the inversion 
of these two tools in the hierarchy of interpretive resources to be 
consulted. Judicial reliance on legislative history may have de-
clined, but substantive canons have not filled the resulting void. 
Second, substantive canons may have something to offer 
purposivism as an interpretive tool. That is, given the doctrinal 
evidence discussed in Part II.C showing that substantive canons 
such as the avoidance canon at least sometimes are used to ful-
fill congressional intent, and given purposivist/intentionalist 
Justices Stevens’s and Sotomayor’s willingness to invoke such 
canons in a nontrivial percentage of the opinions they author, 
purposivism may stand to benefit, as an interpretive theory, 
from expanding its interpretive tool kit to encompass certain 
substantive canons or to acknowledge ways in which substantive 
canons can be used to reinforce statutory purpose. 
D. What Role Do the Canons Play? 
Scholars have long operated on the assumption that judges 
rely significantly on the canons of construction when interpret-
ing statutes.284 This study shows that assumption to be false 
 
 281 Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26). 
 282 Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26). 
 283 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1842 (cited in note 20). 
 284 See, for example, Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 11 (cited in note 26) (not-
ing that “so many scholars and judges believe the canons perform important interpretive 
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with respect to substantive canons, in terms of both the fre-
quency of the Court’s references and the weight it places on sub-
stantive canons when it references them. But the study also, 
surprisingly, shows that the Court relies on traditional tools of 
legal analysis, including Supreme Court precedent, practical 
consequences, and its own sense of what the words in a statute 
mean, at much higher rates than it relies on most statute-specific 
interpretive tools.285 That is, the Court invokes its own prior 
precedents, practical consequences, and text / plain meaning 
with far more frequency than it references statutory purpose, 
legislative history, congressional intent, or dictionary defini-
tions.286 The only statute-specific interpretive tool the Court in-
vokes at rates somewhat comparable to the traditional legal 
 
functions” and that judges “refer to them as an integral part of the ratio decidendi that 
drives their decisions”). 
 285 See Tables 1 and 2. 
 286 I consider text / plain meaning analysis more akin to traditional tools of legal 
analysis than to the canons, because judges often rely on their own linguistic experience 
or intuition to determine plain meaning—rather than invoking a legal maxim or rule of 
thumb. Consider, for example, the recent case Yates v United States, 135 S Ct 1074 
(2015), which is not part of my data set. Yates involved a criminal evidence-tampering 
statute that punishes one who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the 
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence [an] investigation.” 18 USC § 1519. See also 
Yates, 135 S Ct at 1078 (Ginsburg) (plurality). At issue was whether a commercial fish-
erman who had been cited for catching undersized red grouper and instructed to pre-
serve his catch could be convicted of violating this statute when he instructed a crew 
member to throw the undersized fish overboard, destroying the evidence of his crime. 
Yates, 135 S Ct at 1079–80 (Ginsburg) (plurality). A plurality of the Court concluded that 
a fish could not be considered a “tangible object” within the meaning of the statute, rely-
ing in part on the noscitur a sociis language canon. Specifically, the plurality observed 
that “we rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the company it 
keeps—to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its 
accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Id at 
1085 (Ginsburg) (plurality) (quotation marks omitted). The plurality then noted that 
“‘[t]angible object’ is the last in a list of terms that begins ‘any record or document’” and 
that “[t]he term is therefore appropriately read to refer, not to any tangible object, but 
specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects 
used to record or preserve information.” Id (Ginsburg) (plurality) (brackets omitted). The 
dissenting opinion, by contrast, focused on the plain meaning of the term “tangible ob-
ject,” arguing that “‘tangible object’ means the same thing in § 1519 as it means in every-
day language—any object capable of being touched” and that “[a] ‘tangible object’ is an 
object that’s tangible.” Id at 1091 (Kagan dissenting). See also id (Kagan dissenting) (“As 
the plurality must acknowledge, the ordinary meaning of ‘tangible object’ is ‘a discrete 
thing that possesses physical form.’ A fish is, of course, a discrete thing that possesses 
physical form. So the ordinary meaning of the term ‘tangible object’ in § 1519, as no one 
here disputes, covers fish.”) (citations omitted). 
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tools of analysis is the combined language canons + whole-act 
rule + grammar canons tool.287 
This observation highlights one of the central questions in 
statutory interpretation theory—that is, what role do the canons 
play? In light of the data, it is worth asking whether the canons 
are really playing much of a role at all in the Roberts Court’s 
statutory cases—or whether they are, indeed, “window-
dressing,” as legal realist Llewellyn once argued.288 Leading leg-
islation scholars have debated these questions for decades, with 
Eskridge, Frickey, and Professor Cass Sunstein countering 
Llewellyn’s charge and arguing that the canons play an im-
portant role, at least as default rules, in guiding courts to cer-
tain statutory constructions.289 But the data from the Roberts 
Court suggest that the truth may lie somewhere in between the 
two opposing positions scholars have staked out. That is, the an-
swer may depend on whether we are talking about substantive 
canons or about language canons (defined to include the whole-
act rule and grammar rules). Based on the frequency of refer-
ences to particular interpretive resources, it appears that the 
Court does employ language canons often when construing 
statutes (in 32.3 percent of all opinions and 67.9 percent of all 
majority opinions in the data set, compared to a rate of refer-
ence of only 14.4 percent of all opinions and 15.5 percent of ma-
jority opinions for substantive canons).290 
Further work and analysis is necessary to fully understand 
the differences between the Court’s use of language and its use 
of substantive canons, but a few possibilities exist. Whole-act 
 
 287 See Tables 1 and 2. 
 288 Eskridge, 66 U Chi L Rev at 679 (cited in note 22), citing Llewellyn, 3 Vand L 
Rev at 401–06 (cited in note 22). 
 289 Llewellyn famously argued that the canons are after-the-fact justifications, while 
Eskridge, Frickey, and Sunstein argued that they are useful default rules. Compare 
Llewellyn, 3 Vand L Rev at 401–06 (cited in note 22) (listing the canons in “Thrust” and 
“Parry” pairings and stating that the “construction contended for must be sold [ ] by 
means other than the use of the canon”), with Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 
65–67 (cited in note 75) (arguing that canons are useful as an interpretive regime), 
Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 147–57 (cited in note 26) (describing the debate 
around the canons and arguing that they are an important and unavoidable part of stat-
utory interpretation), and Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 451–54 (1989) (describing how the canons were “virtually 
discredited by the legal realist movement,” but defending their use on the grounds that 
“the interpretation of a text requires courts to refer to background norms in interpreting 
terms”). 
 290 See Table 2. 
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rule comparisons or lists susceptible to various Latin maxims 
may, for example, be more readily available in a larger number 
of cases than are on-point substantive canons; if the Court is 
straightforward in its use of substantive canons, employing 
them as helpful guides rather than inventing and reinventing 
them as after-the-fact justifications for interpretations reached 
based on policy preferences, it may simply be finding fewer occa-
sions in which substantive canons, as compared to language 
canons, are helpful. Alternately, the members of the Roberts 
Court may consider language canons and whole-act rule compar-
isons to be more persuasive interpretive tools than substantive 
canons—and may thus employ the former more often in an effort 
to persuade colleagues to join an opinion. Future studies might 
find it useful to explore these and other possible reasons for the 
Court’s dramatically different rates of reference to these two 
forms of interpretive canons. 
E. Codified Canons and Methodological Stare Decisis 
The data regarding the Roberts Court’s substantive canon 
use also shed new light on recent calls for methodological stare 
decisis—the suggestion that federal courts should adopt a bind-
ing statutory interpretation methodology. Recent work has re-
vealed that several state courts and state legislatures have at-
tempted to dictate a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools that 
courts in their jurisdictions must follow, in a prescribed order—
what has been called “methodological stare decisis.”291 A leading 
example is the three-step interpretive framework adopted by the 
Oregon Supreme Court in the case Portland General Electric Co 
v Bureau of Labor and Industries.292 That framework imposed a 
three-tier hierarchy of interpretive tools that required courts to 
consult textual canons at step one, legislative history at step two 
if and only if the textual canons prove inconclusive, and substan-
tive canons at step three, only as a last resort if both textual tools 
and legislative history prove indeterminate.293 One scholar has la-
beled this approach “modified textualism” and has suggested that 
it may constitute a compromise solution that provides textualism’s 
 
 291 Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1754 (cited in note 20). 
 292 859 P2d 1143 (Or 1993). 
 293 Id at 1146–47. 
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best hope of convincing purposivist judges to adopt a text-centric 
interpretive methodology.294 
Relatedly, every state legislature in the country has enacted 
legislation codifying certain canons of construction that state 
courts are expected to follow when interpreting statutes.295 A re-
cent study of these legislated interpretive rules found that only 
a handful of judicially created substantive canons make it onto 
state legislatures’ lists of preferred interpretive tools.296 Among 
these favored substantive canons are the avoidance canon, the 
presumption against retroactive application of later-enacted 
statutes, and the sovereign immunity canon.297 
What is striking about both the state courts’ “modified tex-
tualism” and state legislatures’ lists of codified canons is how 
much they overlap with the Roberts Court’s current approach to 
substantive canons. Notably, modified textualism puts substan-
tive canons last in the hierarchy of interpretive tools, well be-
hind plain meaning, text-based language canons and the whole-
act rule, other statutes, and legislative history.298 The members 
of the Roberts Court, as Part II showed, likewise invoke sub-
stantive canons far less often than they invoke these other in-
terpretive resources.299 
The big difference between the Court’s practices and the 
methodological approach adopted by several state courts, then, 
is the state courts’ commitment not to consult substantive can-
ons at all when textual canons or legislative history provides a 
clear answer. The data from the Roberts Court’s first six and a 
half terms are not consistent with such a commitment—the jus-
tices frequently employed substantive canons alongside 
text / plain meaning, language canons / the whole-act rule, or 
other statutes (in sixty-two of eighty-seven opinions). 
Perhaps even more intriguing, however, is the pattern of 
state legislature codification of substantive canons reported in 
Jacob Scott’s study.300 Very few substantive canons make it onto 
state legislatures’ lists of codified canons. But those that do over-
lap in important ways with the canons referenced most often by 
 
 294 Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1758–59, 1832–34, 1842 (cited in note 20). 
 295 Scott, 98 Georgetown L J at 341, 350 & n 35 (cited in note 24). 
 296 Id at 382–401. 
 297 Id at 384–85, 389–90, 398–99. 
 298 See, for example, Portland General Electric, 859 P2d at 1146. 
 299 See Tables 1 and 2. 
 300 See generally Scott, 98 Georgetown L J 341 (cited in note 24). 
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the Roberts Court. For example, the substantive canons most of-
ten invoked by the Roberts Court were the avoidance canon, the 
rule of lenity, the presumption against preemption, various fed-
eralism clear statement rules, the sovereign immunity canon, 
and the presumption against retroactive application of new 
rules.301 Of these, all but the federalism, preemption, and lenity 
canons were codified by state legislatures.302 The omission of 
these three canons, moreover, is hardly surprising; federalism 
clear statement rules and the presumption against preemption 
have little application to the judicial review of state laws, and 
the rule of lenity is much loathed by legislatures, which tend to 
take a “tough on crime” stance303 and have even gone so far as to 
enact legislation seeking to abrogate this canon.304 
There are also several canons that many state legislatures 
have codified that never show up in the Roberts Court’s cases, 
such as the presumption that statutes should be construed so as 
to “promote justice” or the presumption that remedial statutes 
should be liberally construed.305 Still, the fact that three out of six 
of the substantive canons most often referenced by the Roberts 
Court appear on the short list of substantive canons favored by 
state legislatures suggests a noteworthy degree of consensus be-
tween the US Supreme Court and legislators about which policy-
based interpretive rules are most helpful and authoritative in 
the judicial interpretation of statutes. It also reinforces the point 
emphasized in Part II.C—that the judicial use of substantive 
canons may not be nearly as frustrating to legislative intent in 
practice as scholars have assumed. Both of these points of con-
vergence, in turn, suggest that substantive canons may be less 
threatening, in terms of democratic legitimacy, to the judicial 
review of statutes than scholars have feared—on the theory that 
legislatures are not likely to endorse interpretive rules that em-
power courts to undermine or usurp legislative authority. 
At the same time, however, the data from the Roberts 
Court’s first six and a half terms suggest that neither state 
courts’ interpretive hierarchies nor state legislatures’ codified 
rules account adequately for the role that judicial precedent 
 
 301 See Appendix. 
 302 See Scott, 98 Georgetown L J at 382–400 (cited in note 24). 
 303 Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 957 (cited in note 25). 
 304 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L 
Rev 2162, 2203–04 (2002). 
 305 Scott, 98 Georgetown L J at 400–01 (cited in note 24). 
KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017 11:25 AM 
898  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:825 
     
plays in statutory interpretation. Some state legislative codes of 
construction do mention the common law, but none lists judicial 
precedent or the courts’ constructions of similar statutes 
among the interpretive tools courts should consult. On the one 
hand, state legislatures’ failure to include precedent in their 
legislated rules may not be shocking, because legislatures may 
consider references to precedent to be an inherent part of judi-
cial decision-making, rather than an independent resource or 
rule/maxim/canon that itself dictates a particular interpretation. 
State courts, similarly, may consider precedent to be something 
that courts use as authority for the various textual rules or other 
interpretive canons they employ, rather than an independent in-
terpretive tool that directs courts to adopt a particular construc-
tion and requires its own place in an interpretive hierarchy. As 
discussed in Part III.B, statutory interpretation theory lacks a 
clear understanding of whether precedents are used mostly as 
authority for other interpretive tools or as interpretive guides 
that themselves dictate a particular statutory reading. Again, 
future work examining how precisely the Court uses its own 
precedents in statutory cases would be illuminating.306 
At the federal level, Congress has not prescribed any codes 
or rules of statutory construction for courts to follow.307 But re-
cent empirical work based on interviews with congressional 
staffers provides some evidence about Congress’s views regard-
ing several of the substantive canons invoked most often by the 
Roberts Court.308 Most interestingly, such work reveals that 
while congressional staffers do not know the avoidance canon by 
name, they want and expect courts to interpret statutes in a 
manner that is consistent with the canon’s underlying assump-
tions.309 That is, the staffers responsible for drafting legislation 
indicate that they try hard to legislate within constitutional 
bounds, pay attention to prior case law on questions of constitu-
tionality, and expect the Court to err on the side of “upholding 
 
 306 As noted, Solan has begun this undertaking. See generally Solan, 94 NC L Rev 
1165 (cited in note 265). 
 307 There is a Dictionary Act, 1 USC § 1, which provides definitions of certain words 
that are supposed to apply throughout the United States Code. But the Act does not pre-
scribe any interpretive methodology for courts to follow or provide a hierarchy of tools to 
be consulted in any particular order. 
 308 See Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 940–60 (cited in note 25). 
 309 See id at 947–48. 
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federal statutes” whenever possible.310 This, again, is consistent 
with the doctrinal analysis in Part II.C demonstrating that the 
Roberts Court has often used the avoidance canon to uphold fed-
eral statutes against constitutional challenges and to give effect 
to congressional overrides. In other words, despite academic crit-
icism of the avoidance canon, there seems to be widespread leg-
islative support for the canon as a saving mechanism, and the 
Court, perhaps surprisingly, seems to be employing the canon 
consistently with how legislative staffers expect the canon to 
be used. 
The Roberts Court’s regular use of federalism canons and 
the rule of lenity, by contrast, seems more problematic when 
measured against congressional expectations. When interviewed, 
congressional staff demonstrated little knowledge of the federal-
ism canons or the rule of lenity,311 and many reported an expecta-
tion that when a conflict arises between state and federal laws, 
courts should give greater effect to the federal law—the pre-
cise opposite of the presumption embodied in the federalism 
canons.312 
Both the federal and state evidence regarding legislator 
preferences, then, suggest that scholars have gotten the story 
half right regarding substantive canons. That is, with respect to 
the federalism canons and the rule of lenity, the academic con-
sensus that substantive canons operate in a manner that con-
tradicts legislative preferences seems accurate. But for several 
other canons regularly employed by the Roberts Court, including 
the much-criticized avoidance canon, academic concerns that the 
Court invents or prioritizes substantive canons that preserve ju-
dicial rather than legislative preferences may be unwarranted. 
Indeed, the canons most often invoked by the Court seem to 
align with those that state legislators and, to some extent, fed-
eral legislators endorse. 
At bottom, the data regarding the Roberts Court’s use of 
substantive canons teach both that (1) a methodological stare 
decisis that ranks substantive canons low in its interpretive hi-
erarchy might be closer to the modern Court’s practices and less 
difficult to garner support for—even from textualists—than schol-
ars thus far have assumed; and (2) with two notable exceptions, 
 
 310 Id at 948. 
 311 Id at 942–47. 
 312 Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 944 (cited in note 25). 
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there may be greater consistency between legislative preferences 
about substantive canons and the modern Court’s on-the-ground 
use of such canons than scholars have recognized. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantive canons long have received a bum rap from legal 
scholars. Commentators have argued that there are too many 
substantive canons, that courts invent and reinvent them to suit 
their whims, that textualist judges use substantive canons as an 
escape valve to end-run plain meaning, and that courts employ 
substantive canons in a manner that elevates judicial policy con-
cerns over legislative intent. Most of these claims have been 
based on casual observations, with little empirical testing. This 
Article offers the first detailed empirical study of the modern 
Court’s substantive canon use—with several surprising results. 
Its findings suggest that much of the conventional academic ac-
count of substantive canons may be wrong, or at least overstated. 
Throughout, the Article’s aim has been to illuminate the Court’s 
actual practices regarding substantive canons—and to evaluate 
the implications that those practices have for statutory interpre-
tation theory. 
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APPENDIX.  CASES AND SUBSTANTIVE CANONS INVOKED: 
2006–2012 
 
Case Name Canon Opinion Author Ideology 
*National Federation 
of Independent 
Business v Sebelius, 
132 S Ct 2566 (2012)  
Avoidance 
Presumption favoring 
severability 
Roberts (m) Liberal 
ØReynolds v United 
States, 132 S Ct 975 
(2012) 
Avoidance 
Rule of lenity 
Scalia (d) (avoidance) 
Breyer (m) (rule of 
lenity) 
Conservative 
Liberal 
ΩBrown v Plata, 563 
US 493 (2011) 
Avoidance Kennedy (m) Liberal 
*Citizens United v 
Federal Election 
Commission, 558 US 
310 (2010) 
Avoidance Stevens (c/d) Liberal 
ΩJerman v Carlisle, 
McNellie, Rini, Kramer 
& Ulrich, LPA, 559 US 
573 (2010) 
Avoidance Kennedy (d) Conservative 
*Holder v 
Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 US 1 
(2010) 
Avoidance Breyer (d) Liberal 
*Skilling v United 
States, 561 US 358 
(2010) (override) 
Avoidance 
Rule of lenity 
Ginsburg (m) Liberal 
ΩBartlett v Strickland, 
556 US 1 (2009) 
Avoidance Kennedy (p) Conservative 
 
  In the Appendix, Ø indicates a “passing” or “minimal reliance” case, Ω indicates a 
“some reliance” case, and * indicates a “primary reliance” case. Opinions are coded as 
(m), (p), (c), or (d) to indicate whether the canon in question was applied within a majority 
opinion, plurality opinion, concurrence, or dissent, while (u) indicates that the opinion ap-
plying the canon was unanimous. “Override” indicates a case in which the Court was con-
struing a statute that Congress enacted to override a prior Supreme Court interpretation. 
  Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243 (2006), which employed a substantive canon that 
presumes against statutory interpretations that would alter the federal-state balance, 
was not included in this study because it fell outside the time period of the study—that 
is, it was decided on January 17, 2006, before Justice Alito joined the Court on January 
31, 2006. 
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ΩHawaii v Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 
US 163 (2009) 
Avoidance Alito (m) (u) Unspecifiable 
*Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility 
District Number One v 
Holder, 557 US 193 
(2009) (“NAMUDNO”) 
Avoidance 
Equal sovereignty 
principle (presumption 
against unequal 
treatment of the states) 
Roberts (m) Liberal 
ØFederal 
Communications 
Commission v Fox 
Television Stations, 
Inc, 556 US 502 (2009) 
Avoidance Breyer (d) Liberal 
*Boumediene v Bush, 
553 US 723 (2008) 
(override) 
Avoidance Roberts (d) Conservative 
ØGonzalez v United 
States, 553 US 242 
(2008) 
Avoidance Thomas (d) Liberal 
*Gonzales v Carhart, 
550 US 124 (2007) 
(override) 
Avoidance Kennedy (m) Conservative 
ΩOffice of Senator 
Mark Dayton v 
Hanson, 550 US 511 
(2007) 
Avoidance Stevens (m) (u) Conservative 
ØRapanos v United 
States, 547 US 715 
(2006) 
Avoidance 
 
Federalism clear 
statement (state has 
primary power over 
land and water use) 
Scalia (p) Conservative 
*Arizona v United 
States, 132 S Ct 2492 
(2012) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
Alito (c/d) Conservative 
ΩChamber of Commerce 
of the United States of 
America v Whiting, 563 
US 582 (2011) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
Roberts (m) Conservative 
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ΩPLIVA, Inc v 
Mensing, 564 US 604 
(2011) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
 
 
Non obstante (allowing 
implied repeal) 
Sotomayor (d) 
(presumption against 
preemption) 
 
Thomas (p) (non 
obstante) 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Liberal 
ΩWyeth v Levine, 555 
US 555 (2009)  
Presumption against 
preemption 
Stevens (m) Conservative 
ΩAltria Group, Inc v 
Good, 555 US 70 (2008) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
Stevens (m) Conservative 
ΩRiegel v Medtronic, 
Inc, 552 US 312 (2008) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
Ginsburg (d) Conservative 
ΩWatters v Wachovia 
Bank, NA, 550 US 1 
(2007) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
Stevens (d) Conservative 
ØEmpire HealthChoice 
Assurance, Inc v 
McVeigh, 547 US 677 
(2006) 
Presumption against 
preemption 
Ginsburg (m) Conservative 
ØFowler v United 
States, 563 US 668 
(2011) 
Federalism clear 
statement 
(presumption against 
changing the federal-
state balance of crime 
prosecution) 
Rule of lenity 
Breyer (m) (federalism 
clear statement) 
 
 
 
 
Scalia (c) (rule of lenity 
and federalism clear 
statement) 
Liberal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
ØBruesewitz v Wyeth 
LLC, 562 US 223 
(2011) 
Federalism clear 
statement (police 
powers not superseded 
by a federal act) 
Sotomayor (d) Conservative 
ΩSmith v Bayer Corp, 
564 US 299 (2011) 
Doubts about federal 
court injunctions 
resolved in favor of 
allowing state 
proceedings 
Kagan (m) Conservative 
*Florida Department of 
Revenue v Piccadilly 
Cafeterias, Inc, 554 US 
33 (2008) 
Federalism clear 
statement (exemption 
from state taxation) 
Thomas (m) Conservative 
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*Arlington Central 
School District Board 
of Education v Murphy, 
548 US 291 (2006)  
Federalism clear 
statement (notice 
Spending Clause 
condition) 
Alito (m) Conservative 
ΩBarber v Thomas, 560 
US 474 (2010)  
Rule of lenity Kennedy (d) Liberal 
ØUnited States v 
Hayes, 555 US 415 
(2009) 
Rule of lenity Roberts (d) Liberal 
ΩØDean v United 
States, 556 US 568 
(2009) 
Rule of lenity ØStevens (d) 
 
ΩBreyer (d) 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
*ØUnited States v 
Santos, 553 US 507 
(2008) 
Rule of lenity 
 
*Scalia (p) 
 
ØStevens (c) 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
ΩUnited States v 
Rodriquez, 553 US 377 
(2008) 
Rule of lenity Souter (d) Liberal 
ΩBegay v United States, 
553 US 137 (2008) 
Rule of lenity Scalia (c) Liberal 
ØJames v United 
States, 550 US 192 
(2007) 
Rule of lenity Scalia (d) Liberal 
*Federal Aviation 
Administration v 
Cooper, 132 S Ct 1441 
(2012) 
Sovereign immunity 
(waiver) 
Alito (m) Conservative 
ØSossamon v Texas, 
563 US 277 (2011) 
Sovereign immunity 
(waiver) 
Thomas (m) Conservative 
*Permanent Mission of 
India to the United 
Nations v City of New 
York, 551 US 193 
(2007) 
Sovereign immunity 
(waiver) 
Stevens (d) Conservative 
ØDolan v United States 
Postal Service, 546 US 
481 (2006) 
Sovereign immunity 
(waiver) 
Thomas (d) Liberal 
ØCarcieri v Salazar, 
555 US 379 (2009) 
Liberal construction in 
favor of Indian tribes 
Stevens (d) Liberal 
ØBilski v Kappos, 561 
US 593 (2010) 
Elephants in 
mouseholes 
Stevens (c) Unspecifiable 
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ØAli v Federal Bureau 
of Prisons, 552 US 214 
(2008) 
Elephants in 
mouseholes 
Breyer (d) Conservative 
*Morrison v National 
Australia Bank Ltd, 
561 US 247 (2010) 
Extraterritorial 
application of law 
Scalia (m) Conservative 
ΩMicrosoft Corp v 
AT&T Corp, 550 US 
437 (2007) 
Extraterritorial 
application of law 
Ginsburg (m) Liberal 
ØExxon Shipping Co v 
Baker, 554 US 471 
(2008) 
No derogation of the 
common law 
Souter (m) Conservative 
ØBP America 
Production Co v 
Burton, 549 US 84 
(2006)  
Narrow construction 
against the 
government 
Alito (m) (u) Liberal 
ØKucana v Holder, 558 
US 233 (2010) 
Presumption favoring 
judicial review of 
administrative action 
Ginsburg (m) Liberal 
*Sackett v 
Environmental 
Protection Agency, 132 
S Ct 1367 (2012)  
APA presumption of 
judicial review of all 
final agency action 
Scalia (m) (u) Liberal 
ΩKnight v 
Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 552 
US 181 (2008)  
Burden on taxpayer 
seeking deduction 
Roberts (m) (u) Liberal 
ØHamdan v Rumsfeld, 
548 US 557 (2006) 
Common law of war 
must clearly authorize 
trial by military 
commission 
 
Deference to the 
executive on matters  
of war 
Stevens (m) (common 
law must clearly 
authorize) 
 
 
Thomas (d) (deference 
to the executive on 
war) 
Liberal 
 
 
 
 
Conservative 
ØCBOCS West, Inc v 
Humphries, 553 US 
442 (2008) 
Affirmative evidence of 
congressional intent 
necessary for an 
implied remedy 
Thomas (d) Conservative 
*ΩVartelas v Holder, 
132 S Ct 1479 (2012) 
Presumption against 
retroactivity 
*Ginsburg (m) 
 
ΩScalia (d) 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
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ØCarr v United States, 
560 US 438 (2010) 
Presumption against 
retroactivity 
Sotomayor (m) Liberal 
ØAT&T Corp v 
Hulteen, 556 US 701 
(2009) 
Presumption against 
retroactivity 
Souter (m) Conservative 
*Fernandez-Vargas v 
Gonzales, 548 US 30 
(2006)  
Presumption against 
retroactivity 
Souter (m) Conservative 
*eBay Inc v 
MercExchange, LLC, 
547 US 388 (2006) 
Presumption against 
major departures from 
the “long tradition” of 
equity practice 
Thomas (m) (u) 
Roberts (c) 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
ØStoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 
552 US 148 (2008) 
No expansion of 
private rights of action 
beyond congressional 
intent 
Kennedy (m) Conservative 
*Holland v Florida, 
560 US 631 (2010) 
Presumption in favor of 
equitable tolling 
(nonjurisdictional 
statutes) 
 
Constitutional right to 
access federal courts 
Breyer (m) Liberal 
ØWoodford v Ngo, 548 
US 81 (2006) 
Constitutional right to 
access federal courts 
Stevens (d) Liberal 
ΩGonzalez v Thaler, 
132 S Ct 641 (2012) 
Clear statement rule 
for statutory limits on 
jurisdiction 
Sotomayor (m) Conservative 
*Mims v Arrow 
Financial Services, 
LLC, 132 S Ct 740 
(2012) 
Presumption in favor of 
concurrent state court 
jurisdiction 
Ginsburg (m) (u) Liberal 
ΩHardt v Reliance 
Standard Life 
Insurance Co, 560 US 
242 (2010)  
Clear statement rule 
for attorney’s fee 
award 
Thomas (m) Liberal 
Subject-Matter-Specific Canons 
ØHenderson v Shinseki, 
562 US 428 (2011) 
Ambiguity resolved in 
favor of veterans 
Alito (m) (u) Liberal 
ØShinseki v Sanders, 
556 US 396 (2009) 
Ambiguity resolved in 
favor of veterans 
Souter (d) Liberal 
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ΩKawashima v Holder, 
132 S Ct 1166 (2012) 
Ambiguity construed in 
favor of aliens 
Ginsburg (d) Liberal 
ØCarachuri-Rosendo v 
Holder, 560 US 563 
(2010) 
Ambiguity construed in 
favor of aliens 
Stevens (m) Liberal 
*Felkner v Jackson, 
562 US 594 (2011)  
AEDPA imposes a 
highly deferential 
standard (state court 
decisions are entitled 
to the benefit of doubt) 
Per curiam (m) (u) Conservative 
ΩRiley v Kennedy, 553 
US 406 (2008) 
Liberal construction of 
the Voting Rights Act 
Stevens (d) Liberal 
ΩHoward Delivery 
Service, Inc v Zurich 
American Insurance 
Co, 547 US 651 (2006) 
Narrow construction of 
preferences in the 
Bankruptcy Code 
 
 
“Equality of 
distribution for similar 
creditors” principle 
Ginsburg (m) (narrow 
construction and 
equality of 
distribution) 
 
Kennedy (d) (equality 
of distribution) 
Liberal 
 
 
 
 
Conservative 
ΩTravelers Casualty & 
Surety Co of America v 
Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co, 549 US 443 (2007) 
Clear statement rule 
for disallowing state 
law claims 
Alito (m) (u) Liberal 
ØHall Street Associates, 
LLC v Mattel, Inc, 552 
US 576 (2008) 
Presumption in favor of 
freedom to contract (to 
add to what FAA says) 
Stevens (d) Liberal 
ØHall v United States, 
132 S Ct 1882 (2012)  
Presumption that the 
Bankruptcy Code does 
not erode past practice 
absent clear intent 
Sotomayor (m) Liberal 
ΩHamilton v Lanning, 
560 US 505 (2010) 
Presumption that the 
Bankruptcy Code does 
not erode past practice 
absent clear intent 
Alito (m) Liberal 
*CompuCredit Corp v 
Greenwood, 132 S Ct 
665 (2012) 
Presumption in favor of 
arbitration 
Sotomayor (c) Conservative 
ØNken v Holder, 556 
US 418 (2009)  
Presumption “favoring 
the retention of long-
established and 
familiar principles”  
Roberts (m) Liberal 
KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2017 11:25 AM 
908  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:825 
     
*Board of Trustees of 
the Leland Stanford 
Junior University v 
Roche Molecular 
Systems, Inc, 563 US 
776 (2011) 
Presumption that an 
inventor owns a 
property right in a 
patentable invention 
Presumption denying 
inventors patent rights 
growing out of research 
for which the public 
has already paid 
Roberts (m) (inventor 
owns property right) 
 
 
 
Breyer (d) (deny if 
research paid for by 
public) 
Conservative 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
